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THE RETURN OF CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM
LOGAN EVERETT SAWYER III
ABSTRACT
The return of federalism to a prominent and hotly contested place in
constitutional jurisprudence is one of the most important legal develop-
ments of the last half-century. But this Article argues that current expla-
nations for the return of constitutional federalism are flawed in ways that
distort our understanding of constitutional development and impoverish
current debates over the judicial protection of state authority. Conven-
tional jurisprudential approaches cannot explain why the Court in the
1970s began to turn away from long-established doctrinal principles and
a decades-old theoretical justification for deference on federalism ques-
tions. Political approaches cannot explain why that shift originated with
Justices associated with the political left.
This Article offers an explanation for the return of federalism to
prominence in our constitutional law that ignores neither the Court's
unique institutional norms nor the importance of political change outside
the Court. Through a close examination of the first decision since the
New Deal to invalidate an exercise of Congress's commerce power on
federalism grounds-the 1976 decision in National League of Cities v.
Usery-it shows how durable changes in American government and
politics undermined the dominant jurisprudential justification for defer-
ence on federalism questions. As the consensus surrounding the political
safeguards of federalism collapsed, the debate over constitutional feder-
alism returned. By portraying constitutional development as a result of
the interaction of jurisprudential norms and political change, this ap-
proach casts light on contemporary efforts to generate constitutional
change and current debates over the value of constitutional federalism.
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INTRODUCTION
In the four decades following Carter v. Carter Coal Co.' in 1936,
the Supreme Court did not strike down a single exercise of Congress's
commerce power on federalism grounds.2 The Court repeatedly and by
wide margins upheld national regulation of what had been considered
local economic and social issues: wage payments to local factory work-
ers, wheat production on a family farm, and choice of customers in a
1. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
2. Harry N. Scheiber, American Federalism and the Diffusion of Power: Historical and
Contemporary Perspectives, 9 U. TOL. L. REV. 619, 624 n.20 (1978).
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mom-and-pop restaurant.3 This nearly uniform support for judicial defer-
ence to Congress on federalism questions clearly ended in 1976 with the
decision in National League of Cities v. Usery.4 There, a narrow five-
Justice majority invalidated an extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act
to state and local governments on the grounds that principles of federal-
ism prohibited Congress from using its commerce power to impair the
ability of states "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions."5 That particular doctrine was abandoned less
than a decade later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority,6 but, as Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor predicted in their Gar-
cia dissents, National League of Cities marked the return of constitution-
al federalism. 7 In the nearly four decades since National League of Cit-
ies, there has been continuous and often fierce debate on the Court and in
the law reviews over the Court's proper role in protecting federalism.
Last year's decision in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius (NFIB)8 is only the most recent example.9
The return of constitutional federalism is recognized as one of the
most significant developments in constitutional law in the last forty
years,' 0 yet-as I argue below-a close examination of the decision that
sparked that development indicates that conventional explanations for it
are not just inadequate, but inadequate in ways that distort our under-
standing of constitutional development and impoverish current debates
over the future of constitutional federalism. Those explanations either
emerge from normative legal analysis or focus tightly on the role of con-
3. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942). These decisions
were unanimous or by convincing majorities.
4. 426 U.S. 833, 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
5. Id. at 852.
6. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
7. Id. at 579 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 580 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
8. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
9. , See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000) (striking down parts of
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that
Article I of the U.S. Constitution does not allow Congress to subject nonconsenting states to private
suits); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (striking down the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 as an over-extension of congressional com-
merce power). The Court also used federalism arguments to justify striking down exercises of other
kinds of congressional authority, including statutes justified by Congress's Fourteenth Amendment
authority. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577-78 (2012); Bd. of
Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360-61 (2001) (striking down part of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 as an encroachment into states' sovereign immunity); Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66-67 (2000) (affirming states' sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment); Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging
into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Businesses
v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1,47-50 (2013).
10. See Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1011, 1051-52 (2000).
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servative politics." The vast normative literature that debates whether
the "judicial safeguards of federalism" are properly inferred from the
Constitution includes claims that constitutional federalism returned be-
cause of insights into the proper interpretation of the relevant legal mate-
rials.12 Opposed to these jurisprudential perspectives are political ap-
proaches, which emphasize either the politics of the Justices or the role
the Court plays as a part of a larger political movement. On this view,
constitutional federalism returned because it was effective camouflage
for the efforts of some Justices to promote business interests and other
conservative ends," or because the political success of the "New Right"
gave a series of Republican presidents the opportunity to appoint Justices
who shared their party's opposition to federal power.14
Placing National League of Cities in its political and doctrinal con-
text indicates, however, that neither of these approaches can convincing-
ly explain the return of constitutional federalism. Jurisprudential expla-
nations cannot explain why the majority in National League of Cities
rejected a long-established theoretical justification for judicial deference
to Congress and overturned a forty-year-old precedent that had been re-
cently reaffirmed. Political explanations are unconvincing because the
debate over constitutional federalism emerged before the New Right
seized political power with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and
I1. Minority explanations for the revival of constitutional federalism include Vicki Jackson's
claim that the Court's primary concern was Congress's laxity in considering constitutional con-
straints in Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Court: Congress as the Audience?, 574 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 145, 145-55 (2001), and that the decisions are aimed at protecting the
docket of the federal courts in Ann Althouse, Inside the Federalism Cases: Concern About the
Federal Courts, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sa. 132, 134-37, 142 (2001).
12. John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1311,
1323 (1997) [hereinafter Yoo, Judicial Safeguards]; see, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT 241-43 (1980); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safe-
guards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 216-17 (2000); D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism Redtx: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Na-
tion, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779, 794 (1982); John 0. McGinnis, Continuity and Coherence in the
Rehnquist Court, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 875, 883-84 (2003); John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocque-
ville's America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 485,
511 (2002); Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in
Perspective, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 87 (1981); John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and Federalism, 22
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 197, 197 (1998) [hereinafter Yoo, Judicial Review]; Timothy Meyer,
Comment, Federalism and Accountability: State Attorneys General, Regulatory Litigation, and the
New Federalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 885, 887-88 (2007).
13. See, e.g., Herman Schwartz, The States' Rights Assault on Federal Authority, in THE
REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT 155, 155-60, 162-63, 165-67 (Herman
Schwartz ed., 2002); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002).
14. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY 158-60 (2007); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The
Courts, Federalism, and the Federal Constitution 1920-2000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
LAW IN AMERICA: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND AFTER (1920-) 127, 160-65 (Michael Grossberg
& Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008); J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, The Rehnquist Court
and the Political Dynamics of Federalism, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 233 (2004). For a description of the
New Right, see Kim Phillips-Fein, Conservatism: A State of the Field, 98 J. AM. HIST. 723, 724-27
(2011).
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originated with Justices who cannot be characterized as conservatives,
including Hugo Black and William 0. Douglas, two paragons of New
Deal liberalism and stalwarts of the Warren Court.
Reconnecting National League of Cities to its jurisprudential and
political context also provides an opportunity to present a new explana-
tion for the return of constitutional federalism, one that tries to reveal the
interaction of jurisprudential norms and political developments rather
than reduce one to the other. In what follows, I argue that the return of
constitutional federalism was caused by structural changes in American
government and durable shifts in political debate that undermined a near
uniform consensus that what was best known as the political safeguards
of federalism thesis accurately described American government.' 5 As
that broad consensus crumbled, some close observers of the federal sys-
tem rejected the political safeguards thesis's conclusion that broad judi-
cial deference to Congress on federalism issues should be the norm. One
such observer was Justice Lewis Powell, who then played a central role
in pushing the Court to conclude that doctrinal tensions, which had exist-
ed in the Court's federalism jurisprudence for four decades, were a suffi-
cient justification for striking down Congress's exercise of its commerce
power in National League of Cities.16
I make this argument in four parts. The first part argues that tradi-
tional legal materials do little to explain the majority's opinion in Na-
tional League of Cities (NLC), which rejected a doctrinal principle that
had been established for forty years, an admittedly controlling precedent
less than a decade old, and a theoretical justification for judicial defer-
ence on federalism questions-the political safeguards thesis-that had
driven commerce clause jurisprudence for decades. I conclude that any
solely jurisprudential explanation for NLC will be insufficient.
Part II argues that the political explanations for the return of consti-
tutional federalism are not convincing either. Admittedly, every vote in
the five to four majority came from a Republican appointee, four of those
votes came from recent appointees of Richard Nixon, and the opinion
was written by Nixon's third appointment, then-Justice Rehnquist. 17
However, that evidence is insufficient because concerns with limiting
federal power emerged on the Supreme Court before Nixon's four ap-
pointments arrived and were expressed by Justices who cannot be char-
acterized as supporters of Nixon, the New Right, or conservative politics
more .broadly. Most important are Hugo Black's opinions in Younger v.
Harris in 1971 and Oregon v. Mitchell19 in 1970, which protected the
15. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The R6le of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 556-58 (1954).
16. See infra Part IV.B.
17. The majority in NLC was composed of Powell (Nixon, 1972), Rehnquist (Nixon, 1972),
Blackmun (Nixon, 1970), Burger (Nixon, 1969), and Stewart (Eisenhower, 1958).
18. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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autonomy of state courts and state legislatures on the basis of "Our Fed-
eralism," 20 and William 0. Douglas's 1968 dissent in Maryland v.
Wirtz,2 1 which argued that the Court should strike down an exercise of
Congress's commerce power on federalism grounds and blazed the doc-
22trinal path the majority followed in National League of Cities v. Usery.
Part III begins to provide an alternative explanation of NLC by
showing how structural changes in American government and durable
shifts in the political debate undermined the near-universal faith in the
political safeguards thesis. From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, close
observers of American government agreed that the political safeguards of
federalism were producing effective, democratic governance. They saw a
federal system characterized by shared authority that was both respond-
ing to majority will and helping the nation respond effectively to the
challenges of the time, most importantly in the field of civil rights. By
the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, that consensus had collapsed.
The causes of that collapse included significant reforms in state govern-
ment, systemic changes in federal elections, and the administrative dys-
function produced by some of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society pro-
grams. Of at least equal importance were durable changes in the political
debate caused by the reorientation of the fight for civil rights from de
jure to de facto segregation and Southern state governments' belated
decision to oppose the lawless violence of racist segregationists. The
convulsions caused by Vietnam and Watergate also contributed. As a
result of these changes, a variety of observers concluded that the political
safeguards did not, in fact, produce a democratic and effective distribu-
tion of authority between state and federal governments. Some of those
observers then concluded that a judicial role in protecting the states was
appropriate.
By examining the internal dynamics that produced the Court's deci-
sion in National League of Cities, Part IV argues that the same develop-
ments that convinced some close observers of the federal system that the
political safeguards of federalism were insufficient also convinced the
Court. Central to that argument is revealing the central role Justice Louis
Powell played in the Court's decision-making process and his rejection
of the political safeguards thesis. "One can argue" Powell wrote justify-
ing his vote in National League of Cities, "that the states can 'trust' Con-
gress not to go so far," but the statute at issue in the case disproved the
claim: "the political muscle of organized labor outweighed" the opposi-
tion of "virtually every state and city in the nation" and "what appeared
19. 400 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1970).
20. See, e.g., Younger, 401 U.S. at 44; see also Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 315 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting).
21. 392 U.S. 183, 201 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting), overruled by Nat'l League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
22. 426 U.S. at 851-55.
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to be overwhelming local political views to the contrary." 23 Part IV fur-
ther undermines political approaches by establishing that the replacement
of Democratic appointee William 0. Douglas with Republican appointee
John Paul Stevens in 1975 at least changed a 6-3 vote to re-establish
constitutional federalism into a 5-4 vote, and very nearly led to the op-
posite outcome: a 5-4 vote to reject constitutional federalism.
Part V summarizes my causal claim and contrasts it with other ex-
planations for NLC and the return of constitutional federalism. A conclu-
sion briefly considers the implications of this history for our understand-
ing of constitutional change and contemporary debates over constitution-
al federalism. It argues this integrative explanation for the return of con-
stitutional federalism is important because it provides a case study of
constitutional change that neither ignores the Court's unique institutional
norms nor the importance of political change outside the Court. It also
undermines the suggestion that constitutional federalism is inherently
conservative and that the contemporary partisan divide on those issues is
thus inevitable and permanent. This Article thus provides indirect but
important support for the efforts of scholars investigating how federalism
can advance interests typically associated with the political left, which
can only enrich the ongoing debate over the value of federalism in gov-
ernment and constitutional law.
I. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES IN JURISPRUDENTIAL CONTEXT
By placing the opinions in NLC in doctrinal and jurisprudential con-
text, this part has two goals. The first is to establish that the political
safeguards thesis had for decades generated a consensus on the Court
that judicial deference to Congress on federalism questions was appro-
priate. The second is to challenge the implicit claims made in the vast
normative literature on constitutional federalism that the Court's renewed
concern with protecting state autonomy resulted from an improved un-
24derstanding-or a new misunderstanding-of traditional legal sources.
As important as that literature is for some purposes, it does not provide a
convincing way to explain why the debate over constitutional federalism
returned in NLC. In addition to doubt that such approaches can answer
23. Conference Notes, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., National League of Cities v. Usery, No.
74-878, at 70. (Mar. 4, 1976) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law)
[hereinafter Powell Papers].
24. CHOPER, supra note 12, at 175; Kramer, supra note 12, at 216-17; La Pierre, supra note
12, at 794-95; Yoo, Judicial Safeguards, supra note 12, at 1323; see also Frank 1. Michelman,
States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1165-66 (1977); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a
Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 856 (1999); Nagel, supra note 12, at 87-
88; Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative
Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1067-70 (1977); Yoo, Judicial
Review, supra note 12, at 197; Meyer, supra note 12, at 887-88.
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what is an inherently historical question, 25 there is evidence that makes
such a claim difficult. Although there was some doctrinal support for the
decision in NLC in the tension between the Court's treatment of Con-
gress's taxing power and its commerce power, that tension had existed
for forty years without the Court feeling it needed to be resolved. In addi-
tion, the opinion had to overturn a forty-year-old precedent that had been
relied upon only eight years earlier and reject a theoretical justification
for deference-the political safeguards thesis-that had driven com-
merce clause doctrine for decades.
A. National League in Doctrinal Context
National League of Cities arose from amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). The original FLSA established a national
minimum wage, mandated "time and a half' for overtime in many indus-
tries, and outlawed child labor.26 But until 1966, the FLSA applied only
to employees of private businesses. It did not regulate employees of the
federal government, of state governments, or of state-controlled entities
like state hospitals. In 1966, Congress began to chip away at this distinc-
tion by extending the FLSA to cover employees of state-run hospitals,
some state educational institutions, and state and local transit authori-
ties.27 Following the 7-2 decision to uphold the 1966 Amendments in
Maryland v. Wirtz,28 Congress passed another set of amendments in 1974
that extended the FLSA to all state and local employees. 29 President Nix-
on vetoed those amendments. His veto message primarily argued that the
amendments would create inflation by raising the minimum wage too
quickly, but also briefly mentioned that the law had been opposed by the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and was "an un-
warranted interference with State prerogatives." 30 He later signed the
extensions after Congress passed a second bill with veto-proof majori-
ties."
The National League of Cities, the National Governor's Confer-
ence, twenty states, and four cities sought to enjoin the application of the
25. See Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federalism
Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 480 (2001) (discussing shortcomings of jurisprudential explanations);
see also PURCELL, supra note 14, at 158-59 (arguing that the text and history of the Constitution are
insufficient to generate such insights on their own).
26. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 212 (1934 & Supp. IV 1938); see
also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 109-10 (1941).
27. Those 1966 Amendments to the FLSA were upheld in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,
185-88 (1968), overruled by Nat'1 League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), discussed infra
pp. 240-41.
28. Id.
29. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, S. 2747, 93d Cong. § 6(a)(2) (1974).
30. Richard Nixon, The President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.R.
7935 Without His Approval (Sept. 6, 1973), 9 WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS
1060, 1061 (1973).
31. Brief for Appellants at *83, Nat I League of Cities, 426 U.S. 833 (No. 74-878), 1974 WL
175976, at *83.
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1974 Amendments to states and local governments because the amend-
ments violated federalism principles. 3 2 Plaintiffs did not deny that the
amendments regulated commerce. Throughout the litigation they and
everyone else accepted that the amendments regulated an activity that
affected interstate commerce and that identical regulations of private
parties were clearly constitutional. The issues plaintiffs asked the Court
to resolve were whether principles of federalism recognized by the Tenth
Amendment and other provisions of the Constitution limited Congress's
authority to use its commerce power to regulate the behavior of states
and, if so, whether the 1974 Amendments violated those limits. 34 In other
words, did the 1974 Amendments violate any immunity the states had
against Congress's commerce power implied by the Constitution's feder-
al system?
The doctrine controlling the answer to those questions was decades
old. The most relevant decision was United States v. California,3 ' decid-
36
ed in 1936. In California, the Court considered whether the Federal
Safety Appliance Act could be constitutionally applied to a railroad run
by the State of California not for profit.37 Arguing by analogy from inter-
governmental tax immunity doctrine developed in the late nineteenth
century, the State of California argued that the same principles of feder-
alism that prevented the federal government from taxing instrumentali-
ties of state governments also prevented the federal government from
using its commerce power to regulate states when the state was perform-
ing a public function in its sovereign capacity. 38 Whenever states were
acting in a governmental capacity, California argued, principles of feder-
alism meant they were immune from regulation by Congress's commerce
power just as they would be immune from its taxing power.39
Justice Stone's opinion for a unanimous Court was not helpful to
the plaintiffs' cause. In fact, it rejected their primary argument outright.
"The analogy of the constitutional immunity of state instrumentalities
from federal taxation, on which respondent relies," he concluded, "is not
illuminating." 40 Intergovernmental tax immunity "is implied from the
nature of our federal system" 41 while, for reasons he did not explain,
32. Id. at *82-83.
33. See, e.g., id. at *41; Brief for Appellees at *17-18, Nat'1 League of Cities v. Dunlop, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(Nos. 74-878, 74-879), 1975 WL 173790, at *17-18.
34. Brief for Appellants, supra note 31, at *52-54.
35. 297 U.S. 175 (1936), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. 528.
36. Id. at 183-84.
37. Id. at 183.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 184.
41. Id
229
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
"there is no such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate com-
merce." 42
But an opening remained for plaintiffs because the difference be-
tween the Court's treatment of Congress's commerce and taxing powers
remained unexplained, even after the Court altered its intergovernmental
tax immunity doctrine in the second decision that framed the dispute in
NLC, the 1946 decision in New York v. United States.43 At issue in New
York was a two-cents-per-gallon federal tax on the production of soft
drinks." The State of New York, which had taken control of Saratoga
Springs to address private overuse of the springs and was selling mineral
water in order to fund the resort and spa, joined forty-five other states to
argue that states should be immune from the tax. 4 5 Although a badly frac-
tured Court could not agree on the governing doctrinal rule, every Justice
agreed that the sovereignty of the states required the Court to limit Con-
46
gress's taxing power.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court rejected the traditional
nineteenth century rule in part because "social complexities" made the
rule unworkable 4 7 and in part because, anticipating Herbert Wechsler's
political safeguards argument, "the States share in the legislative process
by which a tax of general applicability is laid.',4 He instead supported a
non-discrimination rule, which required only that the tax treat the states
like it treated private parties. 49 This rule, Frankfurter argued, retained
sufficient protection for state sovereignty because "[t]here are . . . State
activities and State-owned property that . . . . inherently constitute a class
by themselves. Only a State can own a Statehouse; only a State can get
income by taxing."50
Justice Stone wrote separately to argue for a rule more protective of
the states.5' "[A] federal tax which is not discriminatory as to the subject
matter," he argued, "may nevertheless so affect the State, merely because
it is a State that is being taxed, as to interfere unduly with the State's
42. Id. at 185.
43. 326 U.S. 572, 582-83 (1946).
44. Id at 573-74.
45. Id. at 575.
46. Id. at 574-75 (plurality opinion); id. at 586 (Stone, J., concurring); id at 591 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). The rule was applied in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 463 (1905),
overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), Ohio v. Helvering,
292 U.S. 360, 371 (1934), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, and Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S.
214, 227 (1934), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. 528. In a badly fractured decision, the entire Court
rejected the existing doctrinal rule, which allowed federal taxation of "proprietary" State activity-
activity in which a private business might participate-but not federal taxation of "traditional" state
government activities. New York, 326 U.S. at 574, 583.
47. New York, 326 U.S. at 576.
48. Id at 577.
49. Id at 582-84.
50. Id at 582.
51. Id. at 587 (Stone, J., concurring).
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performance of its sovereign functions of government." 52 A better ap-
proach, Stone suggested, was case-by-case balancing aimed at protecting
both federal and state governments' taxing powers while allowing each
government to function with a minimum of interference. 3 "The prob-
lem," he wrote, "is not one to be solved by a formula."54
Justice Douglas's dissent went even farther by suggesting that the
Tenth Amendment prohibited the federal government from taxing any
state activity at all. Frankfurter's non-discrimination rule, he wrote, "dis-
regards the Tenth Amendment, places the sovereign States on the same
plane as private citizens, and makes the sovereign States pay the federal
government for the privilege of exercising the powers of sovereignty
guaranteed them by the Constitution."" Every Justice in New York thus
recognized a role for the judiciary in protecting the autonomy and sover-
eignty of the States from the federal taxing power.
The decision, as a result, gave plaintiffs in NLC something to work
with. The different treatment of Congress's taxing and commerce power
56
was clear, but a principled explanation for it was not. Nothing in the
constitutional text that granted Congress its commerce or taxing power
suggested they should be treated differently by the Court, and both were
enumerated in Article I, Section Eight of the Constitution.57 The truth of
McCulloch v. Maryland's58 famous aphorism that the power to tax is the
power to destroy was dubious in the twentieth century 59 and, even if the
power to tax remained the power to destroy, the expansion of the com-
merce power from the 1940s to the 1960s made the commerce power
look just as threatening to state sovereignty.co
This tension between the Court's tax and commerce powers juris-
prudence provided the doctrinal justification for Justice Rehnquist's rul-
ing in NLC that the 1974 Amendments to the FLSA violated the Consti-
tution. Rehnquist did not deny that the 1974 Amendments were regula-
tions of interstate commerce. It was established, he wrote, "beyond per-
adventure," that Congress could regulate wages and hours using its
52. Id.
53. Id at 589-90.
54. Id at 589.
55. Id at 596 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
56. In Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101-02 (1946), the Court held that the War Power ought
to be treated like the commerce power. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 198 (1968), overruled by
Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 543-
44 (1975), supported the distinction between the tax and commerce power, but none of those deci-
sions provided clear reasons. They are discussed below. See infra notes 124-31, 295-331, and
accompanying text.
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3.
58. 17 U.S. 316, 327 (1819).
59. See, e.g., Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits."),
overruled in part by Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
60. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942).
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commerce power. 6 1 But he nevertheless ruled that principles of federal-
ism implicit in the structure of the Constitution prevented the federal
government from interfering with the integrity and function of state gov-
ernment.62
Not surprisingly, the primary authority he offered for this decision
was New York v. United States. Justice Stone's opinion in New York,
Rehnquist argued, indicated that Congress could not use its taxing power
to interfere with the integrity and function of state governments.63
Rehnquist then argued there was no justification for treating the taxing
and commerce powers differently.64 Finally, he held that the 1974
Amendments interfered with the autonomy of the states because setting
the terms of employment was an attribute of state sovereignty that was
"essential to [the] separate and independent existence" of the states.
Both the minimum wage and overtime requirements limited important
policy decisions of the states and thus needed to be struck down.6
B. National League of Cities and the Political Safeguards Thesis
As the foregoing discussion indicates, there was some doctrinal
support for the Court's decision in NLC, but case law certainly did not
require the result. In fact, as both the tone and substance of Justice Bren-
nan's opinion indicated, NLC was a clear departure from the Court's
Commerce Clause doctrine. Despite the support it found in the tension
between the Court's treatment of Congress's taxing and commerce pow-
ers, Rehnquist's opinion had to overrule California and Maryland v.
Wirtz-a 1968 decision that had explicitly continued California's ap-
proach to the commerce power-and distinguish Fry v. United States 67
a decision from the previous term that also seemed to support Califor-
n 68ma.
Justice Brennan's dissent pointed out these problems and added a
pragmatic critique as well. 69 However, he reserved special vitriol for the
majority's rejection of a theoretical justification for deference to Con-
gress that had driven Commerce Clause doctrine for decades: the politi-
61. Nat 7 League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 840.
62. Id at 842-43.
63. Id at 843-44.
64. Id at 843.
65. Id at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
66. Id at 851-52.
67. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
68. Id at 879 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Fry is discussed in detail in Part IV. See infra notes
295-331 and accompanying text.
69. That doctrinal tests based on a judicial determination of what activities were "essential" to
state government were unworkable, Brennan argued, had been recognized at least since Justice
Stone's opinion in New York in 1946. Id. at 864. Asking courts to determine whether an activity was
"integral" to the function of state government, as the majority proposed, was no better. Id. at 871.
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cal safeguards thesis. The majority decision, he wrote, was a "patent
usurpation of the role reserved for the political process."7 o
Since at least 1942, when it helped convince Justice Robert Jackson
to adopt the "aggregation principle" in Wickard v. Filburn,7 1 the idea that
the Court should defer to Congress on federalism issues because Con-
gress had political incentives to provide the appropriate respect for the
72
states had been central to the Court's treatment of the commerce power.
But the argument was systematized and given its name by Herbert
Wechsler in one of the most cited law review articles of all time: his
1954 Political Safeguards ofFederalism. 73
There, Wechsler famously argued that judicial protection of the au-
tonomy of states was unnecessary, unwise, and inconsistent with the
founders' design and a proper understanding of the judicial role.74 The
Constitution, he argued, did not depend on the Supreme Court's en-
forcement of the enumeration of powers and the Tenth Amendment to
protect federalism.75 It wisely provided other protections to state auton-
omy. The states, he pointed out, kept their own independent basis of au-
thority and their own administrative machinery.76 But even more im-
portantly, they helped select the leadership of the national government.77
Those "political safeguards of federalism" sufficed to ensure the proper
protection of state autonomy.
In advancing that argument, Wechsler emphasized that, even after
the Seventeenth Amendment, states had enormous influence over sena-
tors and thus over national policy. In 1950, he pointed out, filibuster
rules would permit seventeen states with a total combined population less
than the state of New York to stifle any bill.78 And, of course, the power
to stop legislation was a powerful tool in negotiations that the states
could use to ensure fair, or even more than fair, treatment by the national
government.
The House also gave the states significant influence over the na-
tional government. The Constitution allows states to control the shape of
congressional districts-which, in 1954, did not need to be of equal pop-
ulation-as well as determine who could vote for Congress by tying
qualifications for congressional elections to the criteria for the lowest
70. Id. at 858.
71. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
72. BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 221-24 (1998).
73. Wechsler, supra note 15, at 545-47.
74. See Carol F. Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? Congressional Responses to
Supreme Court Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 URB. LAW. 301, 304-07 (1988).
75. Wechsler, supra note 15, at 545-46.
76. Id. at 543-44.
77. Id at 552-53.
78. Id. at 547.
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house of the state legislature.79 Thus, state legislatures, controlled by
state parties, could use literacy tests, poll taxes, gerrymandering, or other
80
methods to ensure that their interests and autonomy were respected.
Even the President, the most national of federal positions, was re-
sponsive to the power of the states. The Constitution itself specified that
state legislatures would determine the manner of selecting presidential
electors. More practically, the Electoral College focused presidential
candidates on a limited number of close states, which provided the peo-
ple and the political parties of those states influence over the President.
Thus, at least some states and some state parties would have the authority
to influence the President on questions of state autonomy.
Wechsler's arguments for political safeguards as the appropriate
way to draw the line between state and federal power convinced so many
because it fit neatly with every major justification for judicial review.8'
For pragmatists, Wechsler's argument freed the national government
from foolish legalisms. When it was necessary to prevent problems like
destructive, "race to the bottom" interstate competition, the national gov-
ernment with the input of the States could institute a single national rule.
When local control was better, national involvement could be avoided. It
was this insight that convinced pragmatist Robert Jackson to support the
"aggregation principle" of Wickard v. Filburn despite his concern that it
would remove Court oversight of the reach of Congress's commerce
82power.
For patrons of judicial restraint, the political safeguards approach
was welcome because it minimized the invalidation of democratically
passed laws. Felix Frankfurter-a leading supporter of deference-
adopted a version of what became Wechsler's argument in New York v.
United States, where he justified his new rule for intergovernmental tax
immunity by noting that "the States share in the legislative process by
which a tax of general applicability is laid."83
For political process theorists who drew on Chief Justice Stone's
famous footnote four in Carolene Products, 84 aggressive judicial protec-
79. Id at 548-49.
80. Id. at 549-52.
81. Charles W. McCurdy, Remarks at the Robert Cross Memorial Lecture (2011) (transcript
on file with author).
82. CUSHMAN, supra note 72, at 224 (recounting Justice Jackson's struggle with Wickard and
his ultimate adoption on political safeguards grounds); see also NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE
BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR's GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 123-25 (2010) (identifying
Robert Jackson as a pragmatist). Justice Stone recognized similar pragmatic reasons in Helvering v.
Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938), an intergovernmental tax immunity decision. The political process,
he argued, "provides a readier and more adaptable means than any . . . courts can afford, for securing
accommodation of the competing demands for national revenue, on the one hand, and for reasonable
scope for the independence of state action, on the other." Id. at 416.
83. 326 U.S. 572, 577 (1946).
84. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
[Vol. 91:2234
2014] THE RETURN OF CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM
tion of rights was necessary only when the political process or the rights
of discrete and insular minorities were being threatened. States, Wechsler
argued, in effect, were not a discrete and insular minority and had ample
opportunities to exercise political power. Stone advanced what later be-
came Wechsler's argument in Helvering v. Gerhardt85 in 1938. He re-
jected claims that states should have the same immunity to federal taxa-
tion that the federal government had to state taxation on the grounds that
"the people of all the states have created the national government and are
represented in Congress." 8 6 "Through that representation," he continued,
"they exercise the national taxing power. The very fact that when they
are exercising it they are taxing themselves serves to guard against its
abuse through the possibility of resort to the usual processes of political
action." 87
For those concerned with the intentions of the founders, Wechsler
pointed out his idea wasn't really his, it was James Madison's. He quoted
a letter Madison wrote that listed three ways the states would be protect-
ed from the national government: (1) the role of the state and the people
of the states in the election of the Senate and the House; (2) the role of
the states and the people of the states in the election of the President; and
(3) the ability of the House and Senate to impeach and remove executive
88
officers. Madison, Wechsler noted, did not mention the Court at all.89
Wechsler's argument provided clear support for Congress's aggres-
sive uses of the commerce power in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which the
Court upheld in Heart of Atlanta Motelr and Katzenbach v. McClung.9'
And its abandonment incensed Brennan in NLC. 9 2 In addition to calling
the decision a usurpation of authority that should reside with the political
process, Brennan specifically cited Wechsler. "Judicial restraint in this
area," he wrote,
merely recognizes that the political branches of our Government are
structured to protect the interests of the States ... and that the States
are fully able to protect their own interests in the premises. Congress
is constituted of representatives in both the Senate and House Elected
from the States. ... Judicial redistribution of powers granted the Na-
tional Government by the terms of the Constitution violates the fun-
damental tenet of our federalism that the extent of federal interven-
85. 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
86. Id at 416.
87. Id.
88. Wechsler, supra note 15, at 558-59.
89. Wechsler's argument was broadly accepted by legal academics, too. See, e.g., CHARLEs L.
BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 73 (1969); Paul A. Freund,
Umpiring the Federal System, in FEDERALISM: MATURE AND EMERGENT 159, 163 (Arthur W.
MacMahon ed., 1955).
90. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964).
91. 379 U.S. 294, 298 (1964).
92. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 876 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonia Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
235
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW
tion into the States' affairs in the exercise of delegated powers shall
be determined by the States' exercise of political power through their
representatives in Congress.93
Brennan continued by arguing that contemporary practice supported
Wechsler's predictions. 94 The "enormous . . . political power" of the
states, he wrote, was not accurately reflected in the potential $1 billion
cost of the FLSA amendments.95 More important was the $60.5 billion
the states received from the federal government. States, he wrote, were
complaining of the costs of the FLSA amendments on police and fire
departments, but the federal government was providing $716 million of
assistance to such entities.97 The states were complaining about the prob-
lems the amendments created for summer jobs for students, but the fed-
eral government was already providing $400 million for such jobs-
enough for 670,000 students to work for state or local government.9 8
It seems clear, given these arguments, that while the majority's po-
sition was not without support in traditional legal materials, that support
was far from decisive. In fact, given the broad support for the political
safeguards thesis and the decisions in California and Wirtz, it seems
more reasonable to view NLC as a substantial change in approach made
in spite of existing legal materials. But regardless of whether NLC is
understood as a correct or incorrect interpretation of existing legal mate-
rials, the important point for the purposes of this Article is that an analy-
sis of traditional legal materials cannot explain the decision because
those materials cannot explain why the tension between the Court's
commerce and taxing power doctrines that had existed for forty years
became unbearable only in 1976. No change to the constitutional text can
explain it. Nor can changes to related doctrinal structures. Rather, some
other factor must explain why Rehnquist and four other Justices in the
NLC majority decided to ignore the implications of the political safe-
guards thesis and resolve the doctrinal tension in favor of state sover-
eignty in 1976.
1I. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES IN POLITICAL CONTEXT
Some scholars who share my doubts that traditional legal materials
can explain the return of constitutional federalism have looked for alter-
native explanations. Almost all found a single cause: conservative poli-
tics.9 They certainly do not agree on every issue.'" Some have argued
93. Id. at 876-77 (emphasis added) (citing Wechsler, supra note 15).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 878.
96. Id.
97. Id
98. Id
99. See, e.g., John Dinan, The Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decision, 41 PUBLIUS 158, 158-
67 (2011).
100. See generally id
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that constitutional federalism returned because it has been a useful way
for conservative Justices to camouflage their efforts to advance a con-
servative policy agenda.10' Others have argued that view is at least in-
complete because they believe the Court's federalism decisions have
generally, but not always, advanced conservative political goals.102 But
they too see politics as the crucial cause, arguing that constitutional fed-
eralism returned because the rise of the New Right allowed Republican
presidents to appoint Justices who shared their party's long established
ideological opposition to federal power.o 3 Keith Whittington's identifi-
cation of larger social, political, and intellectual structures that influ-
enced federalism doctrine points towards a different kind of explanation,
but even he indicates those structural changes mattered because they
provided opportunities conservative Justices needed to advance their own
political preferences.'"0 This part continues examining NLC in its histori-
cal context to argue conservative politics cannot effectively explain the
return of the debate over constitutional federalism that became clear in
NLC.
None of this is to suggest that a political explanation for NLC can-
not find significant support from the historical record. There is, in fact,
substantial evidence. The case was decided after Richard Nixon made
four Supreme Court appointments, every vote in the majority came from
a Republican appointee,, and the majority opinion was written by Presi-
dent Nixon's third appointment, then-Justice Rehnquist, who undoubted-
ly had conservative political preferences. os Furthermore, the majority's
concern with protecting state autonomy had some similarities to Nixon's
"New Federalism" policy. Nixon even vetoed the 1974 Amendments in
part on federalism grounds. More broadly, because the opinion limits
congressional authority, it can be seen to reflect the New Right's opposi-
tion to federal authority specifically and government authority in general.
Nevertheless, other evidence indicates that viewing conservative
politics as the cause of the return of constitutional federalism is incom-
plete, if not misleading. Two Republican appointees dissented in NLC-
Justices Brennan and Stevens-and Justice Brennan wrote the impas-
sioned dissent. Other factors are also hard to explain using a purely polit-
ical model of doctrinal development. First, although Nixon initially ve-
toed the 1974 Amendments, he later signed them, and his brief mention
101. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 13, at 155, 166-67; Fallon, supra note 13, at 449-94.
102. PURCELL, supra note 14, at 158-59; Pickerill & Clayton, supra note 14, at 236-43; Pur-
cell, supra note 14, at 127 74.
103. PURCELL, supra note 14, at 158-59; Pickerill & Clayton, supra note 14, at 236-43; Pur-
cell, supra note 14, at 127-74.
104. Whittington, supra note 25; Keith E. Whittington, Dismantling the Modern State? The
Changing Structural Foundations of Federalism, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483 (1998); Dinan,
supra note 99, at 162; see also Scheiber, supra note 2, at 624 n.20. I further explore Whittington's
arguments in Part V. See infra notes 391-94 and accompanying text.
105. SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 4-5 (1989).
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of federalism in his veto message suggests it was an afterthought.' 06 It is
clear in any case that Nixon did not share the New Right's antipathy to
government power in general and federal power in particular.10 7 It is hard
to understand how the New Right's political preferences could influence
the Court when the movement had not yet seized political power. Se-
cond, and perhaps most damning to explanations focused solely on con-
servative politics, the return of constitutional federalism began before
either Nixon or Reagan appointed any Justices and originated with Jus-
tices who cannot be described as conservatives. The remainder of this
part considers those two points in more detail.
A. President Nixon, the New Right, and Federalism
Although federalism rhetoric and policy played an important role in
Nixon's administration, his federalism policies were not, like those of the
New Right and President Reagan, aimed at undermining federal and
governmental power. Nixon's New Federalism agenda aimed to rational-
ize intergovernmental relations to make regulation more effective. Thus,
in areas where state and local governments had special competence-
community development, education, and job training-the Nixon admin-
istration sought to decentralize real control of federal programs.108 His
General Revenue Sharing Program, the centerpiece of his New Federal-
ism agenda, for example, aimed to replace many narrow federal "cate-
gorical" grants to states and localities with fewer large, virtually unre-
stricted grants.'09
But Nixon was also clearly willing to exercise federal power when
he believed it was the most effective tool. He campaigned to create a
federal minimum-income program to replace the existing welfare pro-
gram."o He aggressively expanded federal environmental regulation by
helping to pass the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air
Act, and the Clean Water Act, all of which placed significant new regula-
tory requirements on the private sector and the states."' He instituted the
first national speed limit in response to the OPEC oil embargo by threat-
ening to cut off all federal highway aid to any state that failed to comply
with the national standard,"l 2 and his 1970 Economic Stabilization Act
allowed the President to stabilize wages and salaries by, among other
106. Richard Nixon, The President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.R.
7935 Without His Approval (Sept. 6, 1973), 9 Wkly. Compilation Presidential Documents 1060
(1973).
107. Whittington, supra note 25, at 504 ("Nixon always had an uneasy relationship with the
'[Niew [R]ight' and its ideological concerns.").
108. TIMOTHY CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF
INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM 20-21 (1998).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 30-31.
111. Id. at 89-90.
112. Id. at 91.
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things, denying pay raises to both public and private sector employees. 13
Nixon clearly did not share the New Right's opposition to federal power.
NLC thus seems unlikely to be a reflection of the policy preferences of
the New Right because the New Right was not yet in power. And Nix-
on's pragmatism is the antithesis of NLC's focus on "traditional govern-
mental functions."ll 4
B. Hugo Black, William Douglas, and the Return of Constitutional Fed-
eralism
Also damaging to the political approach is that the return of consti-
tutional federalism began before Nixon made his Supreme Court ap-
pointments and emerged, in part, from Democratic appointees. NLC was
the first time the Court struck down a regulation of interstate commerce
on federalism grounds since 1936, but it was not alone in supporting
judicial protection of state sovereignty in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Oregon v. Mitchell in 1970, Younger v. Harris in 1971, and Maryland v.
Wirtz in 1968 all evinced that concern in varying degrees. These cases
were decided before Nixon made all his appointments and included opin-
ions written by Justices Douglas and Black-stalwarts of the Warren
Court and appointees of Franklin Roosevelt who are difficult, if not im-
possible, to consider conservatives or representatives of the New
Right." 5
In Oregon v. Mitchell the State of Oregon challenged two amend-
ments to the Voting Rights Act: one that enfranchised eighteen-year-olds
in federal elections, the other that enfranchised eighteen-year-olds in
state elections.116 Given the Warren Court's willingness to reshape state
political structures entirely on its own in Reynolds v. Sims" 7 just six
years earlier, one might expect Oregon v. Mitchell to have been an easy
case. Certainly four Justices believed that the case was straightforward,
but the case produced a fractured decision. Douglas, Marshall, Brennan,
and White voted to uphold both provisions. Justice Harlan's historical
investigations led him to join Justice Stewart, Burger, and Blackmun in
voting to strike both down. Black's vote was thus decisive, and he re-
turned a split decision: voting to uphold the federal provision, but to
strike down the provision regulating state elections.
113. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (1970) (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1904(a) (1970)).
114. Nat'I League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
115. There are other examples as well. See, e.g., Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth
Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1871, 1873-78 (1976).
116. 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1970).
117. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
118. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 118.
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Black argued that the Tenth Amendment and the values of federal-
ism protected state elections from federal regulation. "[T]he Constitu-
tion," he wrote,
was . . . intended to preserve to the States the power that even the
Colonies had to establish and maintain their own separate and inde-
pendent governments, except insofar as the Constitution itself com-
mands otherwise. My Brother Harlan has persuasively demonstrated
that the Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for
themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regu-
late elections. 19
The Civil War Amendments on which Congress relied, Black argued,
provided broad but not unlimited authority. The Fourteenth Amendment
was not "intended to strip the States of their power to govern themselves
or to convert our national government of enumerated powers into a cen-
tral government of unrestrained authority over every inch of the whole
Nation."' 20
Black showed a similar concern with federalism in Younger v. Har-
ris in 1971. His opinion for the Court established a new abstention doc-
trine on the basis of a history of deference to state court criminal pro-
ceedings, the need to protect the role of the jury, and a concern with du-
plicative legal proceedings. 12 ' But the decision was also supported by an
even more vital consideration:
[T]he notion of 'comity,' that is, a proper respect for state functions,
a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union
of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the
National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions
are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.
This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is re-
ferred to by many as 'Our Federalism,' and one familiar with the pro-
found debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is
bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of
'Our Federalism.' The concept does not mean blind deference to
'States' Rights' any more than it means centralization of control over
every important issue in our National Government and its courts. The
Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent
is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments, and in which the National
Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect fed-
eral rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways
that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the
States. It should never be forgotten that this slogan, 'Our Federal-
119. Id at 124-25 (footnote omitted).
120. Id. at 128.
121. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971).
240 [Vol. 91:2
2014] THE RETURN OF CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM
ism,' born in the early struggling days of our Union of States, occu-
pies a highly important place in our Nation's history and its future.' 22
Neither Younger v. Harris nor Oregon v. Mitchell concerned a con-
flict between Congress's commerce power and state sovereignty. The
Court did address that issue in Maryland v. Wirtz and Justice Douglas's
dissent anticipated the arguments Rehnquist would make in NLC. 123
Wirtz addressed the 1966 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act that extended the Act's coverage to employees of hospitals and other
entities run by the States. 124 As the plaintiffs did in NLC, Maryland and
twenty-seven other states argued that the law was unconstitutional as
applied to the states because it interfered with sovereign state func-
tions.125 Justice Harlan's majority opinion rejected the argument, as Jus-
tice Brennan would in NLC, because he believed it was based on the dis-
credited ideas of dual federalism and had previously been rejected in
United States v. California.I26
Douglas played Rehnquist to Harlan's Brennan. His dissent, joined
by Justice Stewart, countered that the different treatment Congress's
commerce and taxing powers received under California and New York v.
United States was unjustified. The federal government, he argued, could
destroy the autonomy of the states with the commerce power as well as
the taxing power.127 Like the taxing power, "[t]he exercise of the com-
merce power may also destroy state sovereignty,"l28 especially after
Wickard and Katzenbach clarified its breadth. Cases like California
should be differentiated from New York and the tax immunity cases not
because California was a commerce clause case and New York a taxing
power case, but because the interference with State autonomy was mean-
ingful in New York (and Wirtz) and limited in California: "It is one thing
to force a State to purchase safety equipment for its railroad [as the law
at issue in California did] and another to force it either to spend several
million more dollars on hospitals and schools or substantially reduce
services in these areas."1 29 Ultimately, Douglas recommended a balanc-
ing rule: "Whether, in a given case, a particular commerce power regula-
tion by Congress of state activity is permissible depends on the facts."'
30
122. Id. at 44-45.
123. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195 (1968), overruled by Nat'l League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
124. Id. at 186-87.
125. Id. at 187.
126. Id at 197 (referencing United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
127. Id. at 204-O5 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 204.
129. Id. at 203.
130. Id. at 205.
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In Wirtz, he found those facts constituted a sufficient threat to state sov-
ereignty to justify striking down the 1966 FLSA amendments.' 3'
Justice Douglas cannot be accurately characterized as either a con-
servative or a supporter of the New Right. He was a principle architect of
both the New Deal 3 2 and the Warren Court's rights revolution.133 He
was so unpopular among Republicans that some had called for his im-
peachment. 134 Given Justice Douglas's support, it is clear conservative
politics cannot be a complete explanation for the return of constitutional
federalism.
III. THE POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS THESIS AND THE CHANGING DEBATE
OVER CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM
If the conventional explanations are unconvincing, how can the re-
turn of constitutional federalism in NLC be explained? This part argues
that the decision resulted from a series of developments that undermined
broadly shared faith in the primary justification for judicial deference on
federalism questions: Wechsler's Political Safeguards of Federalism.135
Wechsler was far from alone in arguing the political process itself was
the best way to properly divide authority between federal and state gov-
ernments. Almost every close observer of American government be-
lieved that real governing authority was shared between different levels
of government and that that authority was distributed through a fair,
democratic process. The leading voices were further convinced that the
sharing of authority helped the system respond effectively to the chal-
lenges of the time. These views were so widely accepted because they
were supported by a particular set of historical circumstances, the most
important of which was the federal government's campaign against de
jure segregation sparked by Brown v. Board of Education.'36 Those cir-
cumstances simultaneously emphasized both the political power of the
states and the benefits of expanding federal authority. They made
Wechsler's arguments against judicial review of federalism issues appear
clearly correct.
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, those circumstances
had changed and the debate over the appropriate role for judicial review
of federalism issues changed with them. Among those changes were the
growing administrative dysfunction produced by some of Lyndon John-
son's Great Society programs, the increasing competence of state gov-
ernments, the shift of the fight for civil rights from de jure segregation
into more broadly, though less intensely, contested issues of de facto
131. Id. at 204-05.
132. EDWIN P. HOYT, WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS: A BIOGRAPHY 69-72 (1979).
133. Id. at 121-24.
134. Id. at 146.
135. Wechsler, supra note 15.
136. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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segregation, the growing power of national interest groups, and the belat-
ed turn of Southern state governments against racist violence. Observers
began to doubt that the sharing of functions between state and federal
governments was evidence of the sharing of real governing authority.
They began to question whether the political process was fairly and ef-
fectively distributing governing functions. Those doubts, in turn, under-
mined faith in the political safeguards thesis and ultimately led to the
return of constitutional federalism in NLC.
A. The Political Safeguards Thesis at Its Zenith
The political safeguards thesis at its zenith was more than an article.
By the early 1960s it was a set of arguments elaborated by a variety of
close observers of the federal system that had grown substantially be-
yond Wechsler's pithy critique of judicial review of federalism ques-
tions. The research those observers produced led to some disagreement,
but its primary effect was to produce new arguments that gave
Wechsler's ultimate conclusions nearly universal acceptance. It was hard
to find disagreement that American government was a system of shared
authority distributed through fair, democratic means. And most leading
voices saw it as an effective tool for solving the problems of the time.
Observers of American federalism had long understood that the
constitutional revolution generated by FDR's appointments to the Su-
preme Court transformed the American federal system.' 37 But until the
mid-1950s, the study of federalism continued to focus on formal consti-
tutional analysis.138 After the mid-1950s, scholars increasingly turned
their attention to the actual operation of the federal system.' 39 These
scholars, wrote Morton Grodzins, a leader in the movement,'4 were con-
cerned not with
formal, or constitutional, power relationships . . . but with social real-
ity; not with the sporadic umpiring of the courts but with the day-to-
day pattern of who does what under whose influence; not with the
theoretical locus of supreme powers but with the actual extent of the
137. See, e.g., GEORGE C. S. BENSON, THE NEW CENTRALIZATION: A STUDY OF
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES ix-x (1941); JANE PERRY CLARK,
THE RISE OF A NEW FEDERALISM ix-x (1938); EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME
COURT: A HISTORY OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY xxi-xxv (1934).
138. Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and Legal Process: Historical and Contemporary Analy-
sis ofthe American System, 14 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 663, 688-89 (1980).
139. Martin Diamond, On the Relationship of Federalism and Decentralization, in
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT: READINGS IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 72, 73 (Daniel J. Elazar et al.
eds., 1969) ("[There is a] general contemporary unwillingness to accept what are deemed to be
formal, legalistic, mechanistic notions of the American [federal] system and an insistence upon the
importance of what are held to be the underlying political realities . . . .").
140. COOPERATION AND CONFLICT: READINGS IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 139, at
Vii.
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sharing of decision-making in legislation and administration between
the central, state, and local governments.141
Wechsler's political safeguard thesis was part of that movement.142
His article examined constitutional text and history, but its real bite came
from how smoothly he integrated those considerations with an analysis
of the political power that states exercised due to their role in the national
government.14 3 Other scholars soon strengthened Wechsler's claims by
exploring how constitutional guarantees interacted with the structure of
American political parties.'" With that refinement, Wechsler's conclu-
sion that the political process was the most democratic, effective, and
thus legitimate way to distribute authority between federal and state gov-
ernments became a near universally accepted principle.
The leading voices in the study of American government agreed
that the American federal system shared important governmental func-
tions. As Grodzins famously put it, American intergovernmental rela-
tions did not resemble a "three-layer cake" in which power was divided
between state, local, and federal governments, but a "marble cake." 45
"Functions are not neatly parceled out among the many governments,"
he wrote.146 "They are shared functions. It is difficult to find any gov-
ernmental activity which does not involve all three of the so-called 'lev-
els' of the federal system." l47 Even government functions traditionally
associated with local control-functions like education and law enforce-
ment-were, these observers explained, really shared functions. 48 Fed-
eral aid in the 1950s, for example, provided school lunches, trained
teachers, built school buildings, and supported testing programs.14 9 Local
law enforcement provided local knowledge and manpower to support
federal investigations, while the federal government provided training,
expertise, and access to information like the FBI's fingerprint data-
base.5 0
141. MORTON GRODZINs, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 254 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966).
142. Scheiber, supra note 138, at 663.
143. Wechsler, supra note 15.
144. Larry Kramer resurrected this argument in his widely noted article. Kramer, supra note
12.
145. Morton Grodzins, The Federal System, in GOALS FOR AMERICANS 265, 265 (The Am.
Assembly ed., 1960).
146. Id. at 266.
147. Id.; see also Daniel J. Elazar, Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations, in POLITICAL
SCIENCE IN THE SOCIAL STUDIES 165, 165-66 (Donald H. Riddle & Robert S. Cleary eds., 1966).
148. GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 4-5, 89.
149. Id. at 5.
150. Id. at 105.
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Observers identified federal grants-in-aid as both the best example
of and most important pathway for this kind of sharing of functions. 51
Though they were created earlier, grants-in-aid had grown consistently
since the New Deal.15 2 In total dollars, they expanded from around $1.6
billion in 1948 to almost $7 billion by 1960.153 Most were "categorical
grants" that provided federal dollars for specific state activities. These
grants had a profound effect on the relationship of the federal govern-
ment and the states,154 but even though the money came from Washing-
ton, these observers believed grants-in-aid encouraged cooperative prob-
lem solving. Grants-in-aid, Grodzins wrote, "have supplied a cooperative
method for achieving results that might never have been achieved." 55
As Grodzins's statement suggests, there was broad agreement that
the sharing of government functions demonstrated that real governing
authority was shared between state, local, and federal governments.
"The sharing of functions is, in fact, the sharing of power," wrote
Grodzins.' 57 William Riker agreed. States cannot control national deci-
sions, the nation cannot control state decisions, and a standoff was the
result. 58 Daniel Elazar-a student of Grodzins-even denied that the
American federalist system was "decentralized."' 59 That term, he argued,
implied there was a central authority that chose to distribute authority to
the periphery. But in America, governing functions were distributed
through the complex interaction of the center and the periphery, each of
which had their own bases of authority.o America, he argued, thus
ought to be described as a "noncentralized" system. 161
In explaining the reasons for this shared authority, no one pointed to
the doctrinal limits developed by the Supreme Court. Such limits were
universally agreed to be moribund.162 Most observers-though not
151. Id. at 60 ("[G]rant-in-aid programs . . . have been the foremost forces to bring about
planned national-state collaboration."). See generally DElL S. WRIGHT, FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID:
PERSPECTIVES AND ALTERNATIVES (1968); Grodzins, supra note 145, at 266.
152. See generally V.O. KEY, JR., THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL GRANTS TO THE STATES
(1937).
153. GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 61.
154. Id. at 60.
155. Id. at 62.
156. Even in the 1950s, there were some who saw the states as lacking authority. C. Wright
Mill's Power Elite (1956) saw power concentrated in the hands of an American elite, a theme sup-
ported by G. William Dornhoff in Who Rules America?, (1967), and The Higher Circle: The Gov-
erning Class in America, (1970). Arthur S. Miller saw economic power delegated to private industry
like corporations, which in reality were more powerful than states, The Constitutional Law of the
"Security State, " 10 STAN. L. REV. 620, 637 (1958), which he saw as administrative units, id. at 629.
Leonard D. White saw evidence of declining state authority in The States and the Nation, (1953).
But by the early 1960s, these views were not shared by students of the federal system.
157. GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 289.
158. WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 103)-04 (1964).
159. DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 3 (1966).
160. Id. at v-vii, 3.
161. Id. at 3.
162. See, e.g., SAMUEL KRISLOV, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 81 (1965)
(describing the Court's approach to limiting federal power as a "'leave it to Congress' attitude").
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all 6 3-accepted Wechsler's arguments that the Constitution protected
the authority of the states to influence the federal government.'" They
agreed that state legislatures shaped the preferences of their state's con-
gressional delegation through their power to apportion Congressional
districts.'65 And state control over federal elections provided a way for
the states to influence their national representatives, thus providing a "de
facto bulwark against overextension of federal authority."' 66
But these observers emphasized the importance of informal institu-
tional structures. Congress's institutional tradition of distributing com-
mittee chairmanships by seniority rather than merit or loyalty to party
leadership left current and aspiring chairmen able to focus on local rather
than national issues. 16 7 State and local lobbying alliances provided anoth-
er way for states to influence national policy,' 68 and state administrative
officers could influence federal authority through their contacts with
Washington officials. 169 And all agreed that the primary reason govern-
ing authority was shared between state and federal governments was the
American system of political parties.170
American political parties, these observers noted, were not unified,
programmatic parties like their European counterparts. They were largely
undisciplined coalitions of state parties with limited ability to influence
their membership.171 "[T]he real centers of party organization, finance,
and power," Daniel Elazar wrote, "are at the state and local levels." 72
This "lack of party solidarity," argued Grodzins, "fundamentally estab-
lishes the marble cake of shared functions that characterizes the Ameri-
can federal system." 73 William Riker and David Truman agreed.174 And
they saw no reason to expect that to change. 175
163. RIKER, supra note 158, at 89-91.
164. GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 277-78.
165. Id. at 220-24.
166. ELAZAR, supra note 159, at 142-43.
167. GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 283.
168. Totton J. Anderson, Pressure Groups and Intergovernmental Relations, 359 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 116, 122-23 (1965).
169. ELAZAR, supra note 159, at 150-51 ("[S]tate agencies can be of help to their state's repre-
sentatives in Washington ... . In return, the congressmen will often help a state agency by securing
additional funds. . . .").
170. GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 254 ("[T]he nature of American political parties accounts in
largest part for the nature of the American governmental system."); RIKER, supra note 158, at 87,
101 ("[T]his decentralized party system is the main protector of the integrity of states in our federal-
ism.").
171. RIKER, supra note 158, at 93 (noting that one of the most well knows facts about Ameri-
can government is that the President cannot "count on substantially complete support from his parti-
sans in Congress").
172. ELAZAR, supra note 159, at 49-50.
173. GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 260. "[P]arties are responsible for both the existence and
form of the considerable measure of decentralization that exists in the United States." Id. at 254.
174. RIKER, supra note 158, at 104; see David. B. Truman, Federalism and the Party Sys-
tem, in AMERICAN FEDERALISM IN PERSPECTIVE 81, 82, 91-96 (Aaron Wildavsky ed., 1967).
175. GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 285.
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States, they also believed, could then use Congress's oversight func-
tion to influence the federal bureaucracy.176 Congressmen worked con-
sistently to help local interests influence administrative action. Congres-
sional staff did this work "with great care, knowing that their congress-
man's performance in that area is often likely to influence more voters
than his actions on remote national issues."l177 Grodzins believed this
oversight was "constant, effective, and institutionalized," and "almost
uniformly exercised in behalf of local interests."l 78
The vision of shared functions and governing authority advanced by
these observers did not, however, blind them to the increasing role the
federal government was playing in governing American society.179 They
noted the steady increases in federal grants-in-aid, as well as Warren
Court's decisions. The Court limited state autonomy with its criminal
justice, incorporation, and desegregation decisions, as well as its expan-
sion of First Amendment protection in the areas of libel, obscenity, and
church-state issues.1so Its decisions upholding civil rights legislation,
expanding federal administrative preemption, and extending the reach of
the Commerce Clause simultaneously increased federal authority.' 8' The
Court was, William Riker wrote, "a major force for centralization."l82
Increased federal authority did not suggest to these scholars that the
political safeguards thesis was wrong. Some minimized these changes, 8 3
but most were unconcerned because they believed increases in federal
authority were democratic and functional responses to the challenges of
the time. They took this perspective whether they found American feder-
alism itself a useful or harmful institution as a whole.'8 Growing federal
power, Grodzins claimed, was a result of technological developments
that were knitting the nation closer and closer together and "the demands
176. ELAZAR, supra note 159, at 144-45; Kenneth E. Gray, Congressional Interference in
Administration, in COOPERATION AND CONFLICT: READINGS IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note
138, at 521, 521-23.
177. ELAZAR, supra note 159, at 145.
178. GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 260.
179. RIKER, supra note 158, at 81.
1 80. Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism-An American Tradition:
Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 227, 279 (1996).
181. Id. at 260, 279.
182. RIKER, supra note 158, at 102.
183. ELAZAR, supra note 159, at 54 (making similar claims); RIKER, supra note 158, at 81
(arguing that federal power had grown, but state power had as well, if not as much). See generally
DANIEL J. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP: INTERGOVERNMENTAL CO-OPERATION IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1962); GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 17-57 (making
historical claims that these changes were not important because American federalism had always
been characterized by functional, negotiated sharing of power); Elazar, supra note 147; Grodzins,
supra note 145.
184. William Riker made clear his opposition to American Federalism: "The main beneficiary
throughout American history has been the Southern whites, who have been given the freedom to
oppress Negros . . . . The judgment to be passed on federalism in the United States is therefore a
judgment on the values of segregation and racial oppression." RIKER, supra note 158, at 152 53.
Grodzins, Elazar, and others were much more supportive. See, e.g., COOPERATION AND CONFLICT:
READINGS IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 139, at 6, 65.
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of the citizenry."s85 William Riker attributed it to a decline in "state na-
tionalism" caused by increased mobility, a growing common culture, and
patriotism generated by war.' 86 Elazar and others argued it was an inevi-
table response to increasing calls for government activity in a situation
where the federal government's taxing authorities were more robust and
-187responsive.
Many also believed federalism made American government more
democratic.' 88 The system, with its divided and overlapping authorities,
admitted Grodzins, is one of "chaos" which "flaunts virtually all tenets of
legislative responsibility and administrative effectiveness. It appears al-
ways to be wasteful of manpower and money. At times it threatens the
very democracy it is established to maintain. But," he concluded, "it
works, it works-and sometimes with beauty." 89 A large part of this
success was federalism's tendency to promote democratic values by
making it easier for different groups to influence the government.190
B. The Zenith of the Political Safeguards Thesis in Context
Faith that the American federal system was characterized by shared
authority and was responding productively and democratically to the
challenges of the time was supported by the politics of the 1950s and
early 1960s. The most important support was the progress of the fight
against de jure segregation in the South.1 9' The failure of the states to
185. GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 319. The "expansion of the central government," Grodzins
argued,
has been produced by the dangers of the twentieth century . . . [and even] [w]ar items
aside, the free votes of a free people have sustained federal programs in such areas as
public welfare, highways, airports, hospitals and public health, agriculture, schools, and
housing and urban redevelopment . . . . The plain fact is that large population groups are
better represented in the constituencies of the President and Congress than they are in the
constituencies of governors and state legislatures.
Id. at 318.
186. RIKER, supra note 158, at 105-08.
187. ELAZAR, supra note 159, at 62-63; WALTER W. HELLER, NEW DIMENSIONS OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY 128 29 (1967). Heller was the leader of the Council of Economic Advisors.
Id. at 15.
188. GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 14-15; Grodzins, supra note 145, at 265-66.
189. GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 7; see also id. at 14-16; RIKER, supra note 158, at 147;
Grodzins, supra note 145, at 282.
190. Anderson, supra note 168, at 117-20. Evidence that these feelings of confidence in the
federal system were shared outside academia is in the U.S. COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR TRANSMITTAL TO THE CONGRESS, H.R. Doc. No.
198, at 2-6 (1955). Tasked by President Eisenhower with identifying programs that could be more
effectively returned to state governance, the Commission spent years of study to "identify only two
programs-vocational education and municipal waste treatment." Purcell, supra note 14, at 147.
191. RIKER, supra note 158, at 142, 155 (identifying the question of "whether or not the na-
tional decision" regarding citizen rights for African-Americans as "the chief question of public
morals," and arguing that "if in the United States one disapproves of racism, one should disapprove
of federalism"); Introduction to Robert S. Rankin, The Impact of Civil Rights upon Twentieth-
Century Federalism, in COOPERATION AND CONFLICT: READINGS IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra
note 139, at 580, 580 ("[C]ivil rights has accounted for much of the recent general tension in our
nation.. . . [and] is one of the few issues in the United States that is intrinsically a problem of feder-
alism."); Robert S. Rankin, The Impact of Civil Rights upon Twentieth-Century Federalism, in
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protect peaceful protestors, civil rights workers, and even African-
Americans not directly involved in the movement from violence, or to
effectively prosecute the offenders, confirmed for many that state gov-
emments were undemocratic and either unable or unwilling to perform
even the most basic task of protecting their citizens from lawless vio-
lence. Simultaneously, the effectiveness with which Southern states re-
sisted even direct orders from the federal government demonstrated that
they retained significant authority in the federal system. Those two ob-
servations made the ongoing shift in authority from state governments to
the federal government seem a functional response to the most pressing
challenges of the time. The claims of the political safeguard thesis ap-
peared borne out in every particular.
1. Undemocratic and Incompetent States
It is clear that the failure of Southern state governments to protect
African-Americans and supporters of the civil rights movement from
violence confirmed doubts that close observers of American federalism
already shared about the competence of state governments. General con-
cerns with the competence of state governments were evident in the
1950s in a variety of sources. The Kestnbaum Commission argued that
pressures for centralization came in part from weaknesses in state gov-
ernment.192 V.0. Key agreed, further pointing out that state governments
across the nation gerrymandered their electoral districts in ways that un-
dermined democratic principles.1 93 State governments were widely rec-
ognized to be heavily gerrymandered to favor not just white but also ru-
ral interests. 194 Observers also noted the significant weaknesses in state
administrative capacity.'9 5 Most state legislatures met only every other
year, and both state legislatures and executives often lacked access to
meaningful administrative expertise.196 Robert Rankin, a political science
professor and Chairman of the Civil Rights Commission,'9 7 wrote,
"[S]tates . . . are to a great degree responsible for citizens turning to the
federal governm8nt for action and relief. . . . [P]eople have demanded
services and protection, and the states have refused to give them."'1
98
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT: READINGS IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 139, at 581, 581-
84.
192. GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 317.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 213-20 ("[U]nderrepresentation" accounts for a disadvantage in states legislatures,
Grodzins argued, though consistent with his sanguine view of American federalism, he also argued
that the role of the cities in electing the governor, their lobbying authority, and their ability to build
coalitions with some rural interests made the problems less than they might appear.).
195. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, I FISCAL BALANCE
IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 36-44 (1967).
196. Id. at 43-44.
197. Introduction to Rankin, supra note 191, at 580, 580.
198. Rankin, supra note 191, at 591.
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The abject failure of the Southern state governments to challenge
racist violence powerfully reinforced doubts about the competence and
fairness of state governments. The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board ofEducation in 1954 sparked an epidemic of violence in the South
against African-Americans and proponents of civil rights that went large-
ly unopposed, unpunished, and unprosecuted. In many cases, it was even
supported by Southern state governments.199 Between 1955 and 1959
there were "210 recorded incidents of [racial] intimidation" related to
tensions sparked by Brown v. Board, ranging from Klan rallies to death
threats, and 225 incidents of anti-civil rights violence, including six
murders, twenty-nine assaults with firearms, and forty-four beatings.200
Between 1955 and 1958, "ninety southern homes suffered damage from
anti-civil rights violence, [including] sixty from explosives, fifteen from
gunfire, [and] eight from arson."201 Over the same period, mob violence
threatened seventeen towns and cities.202
Riots and other violent responses to civil rights protests were a
common occurrence. Martin Luther King's home was dynamited in 1956
during Montgomery civil rights protests.203 An attempt to integrate the
University of Mississippi in 1962 resulted in bloody rioting.204 Two years
later, the Mississippi Freedom Summer led to what historian Michal
Belknap called "a summer of rampant terrorism" 205 that included the
deaths of three civil rights workers, the shooting of at least four other
persons, fifty-two beatings, and the burning of thirteen black churches.206
The Southern Christian Leadership Council's campaign against racism in
Birmingham, Alabama sparked remarkable violence, including reports of
twenty bombings, shootings, and beatings in seven months. 207
What is more, these acts of violence regularly went unpunished, and
often even unprosecuted. An all-white jury famously acquitted the mur-
208derers of Emmett Till, and such jury nullification was not uncommon.
Between 1955 and 1957 "southern juries freed the white defendants" in
thirteen of "fourteen widely publicized" civil rights cases.209 Often perpe-
trators were not even indicted and sometimes Southern law enforcement
even supported the violence. The riots resulting from attempts to inte-
grate the University of Mississippi were themselves sparked by the Mis-
199. MICHAL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH 27 (1987).
200. Id at 28-29.
201. Id at 29.
202. Id
203. Id at 53.
204. Id at 89-91.
205. Id at 135.
206. Id at 138.
207. Id at 99.
208. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 424-25 (2004).
209. BELKNAP, supra note 199, at 32.
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sissippi governor urging state officials and the public to defy the court-
ordered integration.2 10 Michael Belknap has claimed that during the vio-
lence sparked by the Mississippi Freedom Summer, most of the rural
sheriffs believed that their primary job "was to control Negroes, not to
protect them from white attackers." 211 Mississippi prosecutors collabo-
rated with their sheriffs by failing to prosecute offenders, and all-white
juries acted as a backstop for the few prosecutions that were brought. 2 12
Mississippi was a leading site of violence, but its support of racist
violence was hardly rare. In Birmingham in 1963, violence against civil
rights protestors was not just permitted but even inflicted by Bull Con-
213nor's all-white police force. A Miami assistant police chief made clear
his officers would not help protect African-American children as they
began the court-ordered integration of public schools: "If they ask for
trouble, they needn't come to us for guards."214
This violence and the failure of Southern state governments to re-
spond effectively convinced many that states were failing at their most
basic tasks of protecting the rights of their citizens and enforcing public
order. One result was calls for federal legislation designed to force the
states to carry out their responsibilities or to transfer those responsibili-
ties to the federal government.215 Michael Klarman has shown how vio-
lence like the police dogs, fire hoses, and nightsticks Bull Connor's of-
ficers used on peaceful protestors in Birmingham contributed to the pas-
sage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and other civil rights legislation that
extended federal power into traditional state functions. 216 Similarly, the
failure of Mississippi to effectively punish-or in many circumstances
even prosecute-the violence sparked by the Mississippi Freedom Sum-
mer led to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which gave federal
prosecutors the legal authority they needed to prosecute that kind of rac-
ist violence. 217
2. Powerful and Influential States
While perceptions of the states as anti-democratic and incompetent
supported the political safeguards thesis by suggesting that the growth of
federal power was both functional and democratic, the South's success in
using popular protest, state governmental institutions, and their federal
210. Id. at 89-91.
211. Id. at 138-39.
212. Id. at 140.
213. KLARMAN, supra note 208, at 434.
214. BELKNAP, supra note 199, at 33 (quoting Benjamin Muse, Confidential Memorandum on
Law Enforcement in Miami-Conversation with Assistant Chief of Police 1. J. Youell, Folder 75-01-
58-38, SRCC) (internal quotation marks omitted).
215. BELKNAP, supra note 199, at 97-100; see also KLARMAN, supra note 208, at 436.
216. Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J.
AM. HIST. 81, 82-83 (1994); see also BELKNAP, supra note 199, at 99-100; KLARMAN, supra note
208, at 435-36.
217. BELKNAP, supra note 199, at 99-101, 139-42, 237-38.
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representatives to resist even direct federal orders provided proof that
218
American government was not dominated by national institutions.
"Despite constant reaffirmations by the federal courts in the past two
decades," wrote Daniel Elazar, "and despite presidential willingness to
intervene with force where the states allow [the civil rights of African-
Americans] to be publicly suppressed by force, the entire question of
Negro rights remains greatly dependent on the willingness of the states to
aid in carrying out, or in complying with, national policy."219
3. Functional Federalism
A third support for the political safeguards thesis was the progress,
however slow and halting, of the Civil Rights Movement, which was
seen as evidence that the federal system worked.220 Morton Grodzins
summarized this argument. He saw the "Negro problem" as the problem
of de jure segregation in the South,22 1 and recognized that federalism had
helped create it by giving southern states the power to slow national ac-
tion.222 But he still saw progress, which led him to keep faith with feder-
alism.223 He admitted one reason for progress was the "sheer force of
public opinion," pushed by the decision in Brown v. Board and the Cold
W 22War.224 But federalism, he argued, was another. It made African-
Americans in Northern and Midwestern cities a crucial voting bloc that
could push presidents and non-Southern elected officials towards re-
form. 2 25 "Integration of Negros," he concluded, "everywhere in law and
many places in social life, will be achieved, I believe, in a relatively short
time, [by] utilizing the possibilities of federalism to overcome the barri-
ers a federal system had previously supported." 226
C. Changing Contexts
The circumstances that supported the near universal faith in the po-
litical safeguards thesis, however, had changed by the early 1970s. Ris-
ing faith in state governance as a result of their belated concern with rac-
218. GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 297-98.
219. ELAZAR, supra note 159, at 5-6.
220. GRODZINS, supra note 141; Elazar, supra note 147, at 167-70. Grodzins, for example,
described school desegregation as an example of a conflict so fundamental that only a "demonstra-
tion of strength on one side or another" could solve it, but also saw it as reaching the correct solution
because "the view of the whole nation must prevail" on such basic conflicts. Grodzins, supra note
145, at 278.
221. GRODZINS, supra note 141, at 292-93 (describing the "Negro problem" as a problem of
African-Americans being denied "the vote and the equal use of publicly supported facilities, espe-
cially schools, but also . . . public transportation, libraries, parks, and swimming pools," rights they
had already won in the North).
222. Id. at 292-94.
223. Id. at 301.
224. Id. at 301-03.
225. Id. at 294-95, 295 n.t (providing an Editor's Note discussing the "civil rights break-
through of 1964 which brought a total collapse of the Southerner's veto power over civil rights
legislation in Congress" for excellent evidence of this change).
226. Id. at 306.
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ist violence combined with rising concerns about federal dysfunction to
convince many that the rapidly accelerating growth in federal authority
was unlikely to be the result of a fair, democratic process. Simultaneous-
ly, a decline in the political influence of state political parties and a rise
in the power of national interest groups offered a way to explain what
many saw as unproductive increases in federal power. Together these
developments undermined faith that the political safeguards thesis was
an accurate description of American government. That conclusion, in
turn, led to new support for judicial intervention.
1. Expanding Federal Authority
Though growth in federal authority was a consistent theme of the
twentieth century, observers perceived a clear acceleration in the mid- to
late-1960s. Through the 1950s domestic spending remained equally bal-
anced between the states and the federal government, a place it had
reached after a slow and steady increase from the federal government's
22720% share in 1929. The 1960s, on the other hand, saw explosive
growth in federal domestic spending. The number of grants-in-aid rose
from 132 in 1960 to 379 in 1968.228 Total federal aid to the states rose
from "$7 billion in 1960 to $24 billion in 1970.,,229 As a result, the per-
centage of state budgets provided by the federal government increased by
almost 35%.230
The scope of federal power expanded as well. The New Deal in-
creased federal authority, but focused on national economic regulation
and social insurance.231 The Great Society, on the other hand, went much
further by combining professional services, social sciences, and federal
232
authority to address a variety of social problems. It promoted "racial
integration in housing and education," challenged sex discrimination, and
instituted education, community development, and anti-poverty pro-
grams.233 Through funding decisions or traditional regulations, the feder-
al government began regulating an enormous number of activities that
had been traditionally considered local: "elementary and secondary edu-
cation, local law enforcement, libraries," fire control, environmental pro-
tection, and antipoverty programs. 234
227. TIMOTHY CONLAN, NEW FEDERALISM: INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM FROM NIXON TO
REAGAN 5 (1988).
228. Id at 6.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 9.
232. CONLAN, supra note 108, at 8; see also Samuel H. Beer, The Adoption of General Reve-
nue Sharing: A Case Study in Public Sector Politics, in 24 PUB. POL'Y 127, 160 (Lawrence D.
Brown et al. eds., 1976).
233. CONLAN, supra note 227, at 9.
234. Id. at 6.
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James Sundquist's analysis for the Brookings Institution in 1969
was a typical reaction. "In the nineteen-sixties," he wrote, "the American
federal system entered a new phase."235 Congress asserted national au-
thority "in a wide range of governmental functions that until then had
been the province, exclusively or predominantly, of state and local gov-
ernments."236 This "massive federal intervention in community affairs
came in some of the most sacrosanct of all the traditional preserves of
state and local authority," including "education[,] . . . local law enforce-
ment[,] . . . manpower training and area economic development,... mass
transportation, water systems, and sewage treatment plants." 237
This was far more than a simple change in who paid. Dramatic al-
terations in the size and character of "federal grant-in-aid programs" had
caused a "transformation of the federal system," Sundquist wrote.238 Ear-
lier grant-in-aid programs helped states address what were seen as local
issues. As a result, federal review focused on ensuring efficiency, and
"[p]olicy making [authority] . . . remained where it resided before the
functions were assisted." 23 9 But the grants of the 1960s addressed nation-
al issues and "[a]chievement of a national objective requires close feder-
al control over the content of the program." 240 The result was "new pat-
terns of relationships" between levels of government.241 Other scholars
saw similar developments. 242
2. Growing Concerns with Federal Dysfunction
Close observers of the federal system-including many who a dec-
ade earlier had been remarkably sanguine about American federalism-
also became concerned that those increases in federal authority were
producing fragmentation, disorganization, and inefficiency. 243 The Advi-
sory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations was a bipartisan com-
mission of congressmen, state officials, private citizens, and federal bu-
reaucrats created in 1959 to recommend improvements to the federal
235. JAMES L. SUNDQUIST WITH DAVID W. DAVIS, MAKING FEDERALISM WORK: A STUDY OF
PROGRAM COORDINATION AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL I (1969).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 3.
240. Id. at 4-6.
241. Id. at 1.
242. Daniel Elazar argued in 1973 that the growth of project grants in the 1960s-grants which
states and localities had to apply for rather than simply receive conditioned on following federal
guidelines-"transferred the decision as to who would get what from the normal federal-state chan-
nels to Washington." Daniel J. Elazar, Cursed by Bigness or Toward a Post-Technocratic Federal-
ism, 3 PUBLIUS 239, 281 (1973). Michael Reagan believed these changes were so significant that
their emergence explained why Morton Grodzins, who died in 1964 "just before the explosive pro-
liferation of grant programs, particularly those of a project nature," had misunderstood the nature of
the federal system. MICHAEL D. REAGAN, THE NEW FEDERALISM 161 (1972); see also Bruce K.
MacLaury, Foreword to GEORGE F. BREAK, FINANCING GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM vii
(1980).
243. CONLAN, supra note 108, at 6-7.
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system. 244 The General Accounting Office and Lynden Johnson's Bureau
of the Budget agreed. The Bureau of the Budget found that the "com-
plexity and fragmentation of federal grant programs . . . creates major
problems of administration for both the federal government and local
governments and inhibits the development of a unified approach to the
solution of community problems."245 Daniel Elazar saw a federal bureau-
cracy that had become so unwieldy it was beyond the control of the Pres-
ident. 2 46 Even Democratic politicians like Senator Edmund Muskie of
Maine and LBJ's budget director began to question the ability of federal
bureaucrats to oversee local plans and support decentralization. 247
These concerns gained strength from other sources. Vietnam, stag-
flation, and Watergate decreased faith in all levels of government, but
damaged the federal government most severely.248 The shift of federal
regulation into more broadly controversial topics was also damaging. In
the 1950s and early 1960s, the most obvious extensions of federal power
were aimed at de jure segregation and massive resistance in the South.
Though many Southerners clearly opposed federal authority, the violence
of fire hoses and police dogs made clear for others the need for federal
intervention. But after the mid-1960s federal intervention turned towards
de facto segregation, most visibly the use of busing to address school
segregation. That issue was a complicated one for many and created new
doubts about the effectiveness of expanding federal power. "The contro-
versy over busing," wrote one commentator, "shows perfectly the diffi-
culties to be encountered, once the first step is taken down the road of
adding flesh to the constitutional bones of federalism."249
3. Democratic and Competent States
Doubts about federal competence rose in tandem with faith in the
competence of state government. An important reason for the improve-
ments in state government was, ironically, federal intervention. The War-
ren Court's apportionment decisions made woefully gerrymandered state
legislatures more responsive to the popular will,250 while its criminal
procedure decisions removed some of the state executives' worst excess-
244. What Is ACIR?, Archive, U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL.,
http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Default.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2014).
245. CONLAN, supra note 108, at 7 (omission in original) (quoting ADVISORY COMM'N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, IMPROVING FEDERAL GRANTS MANAGEMENT: THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL GRANT SYSTEM-AN ASSESSMENT AND PROPOSED POLICIES 11-12 (1977))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
246. Elazar, supra note 242, at 281.
247. CONLAN, supra note 108, at 7.
248. See TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE (1993); JOHN ROBERT
GREENE, AMERICA IN THE SIXTIES 135 (2010); KIM MCQUAID, THE ANXIOUS YEARS: AMERICA IN
THE VIETNAM-WATERGATE ERA, 319-20 (1989); Jerald G. Bachman & M. Kent Jennings, The
Impact of Vietnam on Trust in Government, 31 J. SOC. ISSUES 141, 141 (1975).
249. Richard H. Leach, Federalism: A Battery of Questions, 3 PUBLIUS 11, 22 (1973).
250. Mavis Mann Reeves, The States as Polities: Reformed, Reinvigorated, Resourceful, 509
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 83, 86-87 (1990); Whittington, supra note 104, at 521.
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es. 2 5 1 The requirements of administering federal grant programs also en-
couraged states to improve their administrative capacities.252 Other de-
velopments included states instituting annual rather than semiannual leg-
islative sessions.253
But more important to growing faith in state government was the
belated decision of the Southern state governments to prosecute the racist
violence. The Civil Rights Act of 1968 gave the federal government new
tools to prosecute racist violence, but the law went largely unused be-
cause growing fears of a breakdown of law and order led Southern states
to begin prosecuting and convicting perpetrators of that violence.254 In
stark contrast to the 1950s and early 1960s, Southern authorities charged
132 members of the KKK with "378 felonies and serious misdemeanors"
255between March 1967 and March 1969. And Southern juries often re-
turned convictions. 256 "By September 1973 the New York Times was able
to report the 'virtual disappearance' . . . of unpunished [racist violence in
the South]."257
4. Weak States and Special Interests
As doubts rose that the accelerating shift of governing authority to
Washington was a functional response to the challenges of the time,
changes in national politics offered a way to explain why the shift was
continuing: the collapse of the political power of the states and the rising
influence of national interest groups. Many observers saw how television
and the age of mass campaigns had increased the influence of national
interest groups. They also regularly noted the growing evidence that state
political parties were losing influence over the national government in
response to developments in state politics and the structure of Congress
itself. The structures most people had identified as the central political
safeguards of federalism, in other words, were eroding.
Federal action in the 1960s may have made state governments more
competent, but it also reduced the ability of state political parties to in-
fluence their federal representatives. The Warren Court apportionment
decisions made it more difficult to use gerrymandering to shape the pref-
erences of a state congressional delegation,258 as did the 1965 Voting
251. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 96-97 (1998).
252. Samuel H. Beer, The Modernization of American Federalism, 3 PUBLIUS 49, 83 (1973);
Reeves, supra note 250, at 85; Whittington, supra note 104, at 521.
253. Reeves, supra note 250, at 88; Purcell, supra note 14, at 156-57.
254. BELKNAP, supra note 199, at 237-42.
255. Id. at 234.
256. Id.at235.
257. Id. at 232.
258. GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL
POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT 40-41 (1966); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and
Reapportionment, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970s 57,61 (Nelson W. Polsby ed., 1971).
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Rights Act and the prohibition of poll taxes and literacy tests. 259 Reforms
in Congress had a similar impact. The Legislative Reorganization Act of
1970 ended the era when powerful committee chairmen appointed by
seniority could bend the legislative agenda to the interests of their local
constituents with impunity.260 Those changes became clear in 1974 when
the senior chairs of the Agriculture, Armed Services, and Banking Com-
261
mittees were deposed2. Committee chairmen learned to be much more
responsive to the party caucus, which reduced the influence of the state
party. 262
The decline of state parties made them less able to mobilize voters
and further undermined their influence. "[O]ur parties," wrote Samuel
Beer, "have entered a state of decline." 263 Increases in ticket-splitting,
rising numbers of independents, and related changes were "abundantly in
evidence."264 As television advertising became critical to political cam-
paigns, fundraising increased in importance relative to party action and
legislators quickly found that national interest groups-the AARP, the
NRA, the Sierra Club, the AFL-CIO, and the Chamber of Commerce-
could more easily contribute money.265 As a result, those national con-
stituencies and their national interests gained salience. As the state par-
ties lost influence over their representatives, their ability to use congres-
sional oversight to influence the federal bureaucracy declined as well.266
The impression of limited congressional control over the bureaucracy
was strengthened by growing concerns with "iron triangles" in which
congressmen had to share influence with interest groups and state and
federal administrators.267
D. The Consensus Fractures
These developments led many to re-evaluate their belief that the
American federal system was one characterized by shared governing
authority.268 Not everyone changed their mind, 269 certainly. But many
259. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654-56 (1966) (upholding the suspension of litera-
cy tests); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (prohibiting poll taxes).
260. CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMMITrEES IN CONGRESS 35 (3d ed.
1997).
261. Id at 38.
262. Id.
263. Beer, supra note 252, at 94.
264. Id
265. See Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 847, 862-65 (1979).
266. Id.
267. See generally HAROLD SEIDMAN, POLITICS, POSITION AND POWER 271-77 (1st ed. 1970).
268. See Robert J. Pranger, The Decline of the American National Government, 3 PUBLIUS 97,
115 (1973) ("Until recently a profound nationalistic enthusiasm was widespread in the United States.
Today there is a much more reserved attitude toward the nation, especially among educated people.
Why? Some have blamed the Vietnam War or a more general technocratic organization that has
produced citizen alienation and powerlessness. Another explanation might be that the national center
can no longer generate nationalistic enthusiasm because it no longer operates as a center for the
nation as a whole.").
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became convinced that states did not have the governing authority the
political safeguards thesis predicted they should. By 1973, Michael
270Reagan, who was a proponent of greater nationalization, was persuad-
ed Grodzins and others had badly misunderstood the way the American
federal system functioned. They had, he argued, "confused sharing of
functions with sharing of power." 2 71 The system he saw was so clearly
not a system of shared governing authority-even if it was a system of
shared administration-that it needed a new name. "Cooperative" and
"creative" federalism were not accurate descriptions.272 "[P]ermissive
federalism," Reagan suggested, was more accurate because states exer-
cised real authority only with the permission of the federal govern-
ment.273 What real power states had was vestigial, and effectively mean-
ingless. 274
A strong indication of the effect changed circumstances had on faith
in the political safeguards thesis was the changed perspective of Daniel
Elazar, a strong proponent of Morton Grodzin's sharing approach in the
early 1960s. By the early 1970s, Elazar believed, with Reagan, that the
sharing of functions did not indicate the sharing of real power.275 It was
possible, said Elazar, in the 1960s and 70s to "confuse all kinds of feder-
al-state-local interaction with 'cooperation' whether the interaction in-
volved federal coercion or not." 276 He ultimately rejected Grodzins' shar-
ing hypothesis. "When Grodzins wrote" in the 1950s, he claimed,
there were still substantial constitutional and other kinds of barriers
(including party, which he emphasized) to centralization of power in
Washington, whether for its direct exercise or for the sake of decen-
tralization along presumably more rational lines. Today, those barri-
ers have by and large disappeared. Powers can be transferred to
Washington in one way or another and, once transferred, are leading
to token decentralization that becomes, in reality, the greater exercise
of those powers by a newly enhanced national government. 277
Theodore Lowi's thought followed a similar line. His 1969 The End
ofLiberalism saw a lack of centralized control as the hallmark of Ameri-
can government but by 1978 emphasized the power and importance of a
269. JAMES A. MAXWELL & J. RICHARD ARONSON, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS 252-53 (3d ed. 1977).
270. REAGAN, supra note 242, at 53.
271. Id. at 161.
272. Id at 163 (internal quotation mark omitted).
273. Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
274. Id. at 13.
275. Elazar, supra note 242, at 244.
276. Id. at 245.
277. Id at 243.
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central national state. 278 Others-even those who supported that centrali-
zation-noted similar trends.279
A 1973 symposium on the state of the American federal system is
another indicator.280 An animating question of the conference was
whether "rather clearly definable limitations on federal and state action"
had been removed and whether "our present mechanisms for making
policy constitutionally and/or prudentially satisfactory in order to main-
tain our federal system[.]" 281 Martin Landau had a clear answer to the
first issue: "It is plain to see, however, that the nationalization ... of au-
thority has all but stripped the states of their independence. ... And there
is little doubt today that any of the residues of the classical federal rela-
,,282tionship can be set aside by the national government.
To conclude that the political process no longer protected state au-
tonomy did not require one to believe that state autonomy needed judi-
cial protection. Many observers who saw a decline in the real governing
authority of the states neither supported decentralization nor called for a
return of constitutional federalism. 283 Michael Reagan, most notably,
remained opposed to constitutional federalism and even decentralization,
as did other prominent voices, including William Riker and, later, Jesse
Choper.2 8
The decline of what had been seen as the most important of the po-
litical safeguards of federalism nevertheless explained to some why the
American government was transferring authority away from increasingly
competent states to the increasingly incompetent federal government.
And as doubts about the political safeguards thesis grew, so did calls for
the return of constitutional federalism.
278. Scheiber, supra note 138, at 673 (citing THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 26
(1969)); Theodore J. Lowi, Europeanization of America? From United States to United State, in
NATIONALIZING GOVERNMENT: PUBLIC POLICIES IN AMERICA 15, 18 (Theodore J. Lowi & Alan
Stone eds., 1978).
279. Scheiber, supra note 138, at 673 (citing Martin Landau, Baker v. Carr and the Ghost of
Federalism, in EMPIRICAL DEMOCRATIC THEORY 131, 137 (Charles Cnudde & D.E. Neubauer eds.,
1969); Henry Abraham, Effectiveness of Governmental Operations, 426 ANNALS 81, 94 (1976)).
280. Daniel J. Elazar, First Principles, 3 PUBLIUS 1, 1 (1973).
281. Id. at 7.
282. Martin Landau, Federalism, Redundancy and System Reliability, 3 PUBLIUS 173, 191-92
(1973).
283. Richard Leach argued in 1973 that the judiciary was too involved in questions of federal-
ism because it limited the authority of the states and encouraged less judicial involvement. Leach,
supra note 249, at 23. Though even he admitted that one "judicial review has a merit" in that it can
correct the overreach by Congress and the executive. Id. "The police power was not delegated to
Congress . . . . [Als a part of the reservoir of state power, it permits a great deal of flexibility at the
state level in the development of government policy," a flexibility Leach believes Congress and the
President are eliminating, a shift antithetical to the goals of the founders and good government. Id. at
23-25.
284. REAGAN, supra note 242, at 52-53; RIKER, supra note 158, at 155; Jesse H. Choper, The
Scope of National Power Vis-a- Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J.
1552, 1555 (1977).
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In the legal academy, scholars like Alexander Bickel and Phillip
Kurland, most notably, began to complain about excessive nationaliza-
285tion. Bickel's The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress criticized
the Warren Court for failing to defer to the democratically elected
branches of both nation and states.286 Kurland made similar claims in
1970 in Politics, the Constitution, and the Warren Court and spoke sor-
rowfully of the elimination of federalism elsewhere.287 In Storm over the
States, Democratic presidential candidate Terry Sanford argued a "new
federalism" was necessary to free all levels of government from the spe-
cial interests.288
Other observers went a step beyond critique and urged the judiciary
to rediscover constitutional federalism. One of the animating questions of
the 1973 conference on the state of American federalism was, "Should
we consider placing an increased emphasis upon constitutional barri-
ers . .. ?"289 Martin Diamond called for a return to the doctrine of enu-
merated powers. 29 0 Daniel Elazar, too, supported such a move. The
founders, he wrote, had "wisely noted" that "the preservation of constitu-
tional barriers is necessary . . . [g]iven the nature of men and the prob-
lems of maintaining restraint under political pressure."291 He thus con-
cluded that "the re-establishment of constitutional restraints in areas oth-
er than those linked with the Bill of Rights should be a high priority mat-
ter."292
IV. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES AND THE POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS
THESIS INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
The internal papers of the Supreme Court indicate that the same
changes that led observers of the federal system outside the Court to lose
faith in the political safeguards thesis had the same effect on the Justices
inside the Court. Those changes framed the arguments made by the Na-
tional League of Cities and supporting amici. They also convinced Jus-
tice Lewis Powell, who saw his doubts about the theory epitomized in
NLC and then played the central role in building the coalition that, for the
first time in forty years, struck down an exercise of Congress's com-
merce power on federalism grounds.
285. Scheiber, supra note 138, at 666, 674 n.8.
286. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 173-81 (1970);
see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 120-21 (1975); Edward A. Purcell,
Jr., Alexander M. Bickel and the Post-Realist Constitution, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 521, 546
(1976).
287. PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 96-97
(1970); see also PHILIP B. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 5 (1978); Philip B.
Kurland, The Impotence ofReticence, 1968 DUKE L.J. 619, 621 (1968).
288. TERRY SANFORD, STORM OVER THE STATES 207-12 (1967).
289. Elazar, supra note 280, at 7.
290. Martin Diamond, The Forgotten Doctrine of Enumerated Powers, 6 PUBLIUS 187, 188,
193 (1976).
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A. Fry v. United States: Laying the Groundwork
Powell's interest in NLC and his central role in building a coalition
willing to revive constitutional federalism are revealed by the debate
inside the Court over Fry v. United States, a case from the previous term
that was decided in the midst of arguments over NLC. Fry concerned a
federalism challenge to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 (ESA).2 93
The ESA aimed to slow runaway inflation by empowering a presidential-
ly appointed Pay Board to deny wage increases by both public and pri-
294
vate employers. Ohio brought suit claiming the law could not be con-
stitutionally applied to the states.295 The Tenth Amendment and the struc-
ture of the Constitution, it argued, did not allow Congress to interfere
with "sovereign state functions," which included the authority to set
wages for at least some of the employees covered by the statute.296
From the outside, the Court seemed to have few problems rejecting
Ohio's claim. Justice Marshall's brief opinion for seven Justices held that
the case was controlled by Maryland v. Wirtz, which "reiterated the prin-
ciple that States are not immune from all federal regulation under the
Commerce Clause merely because of their sovereign status." 297 justice
Douglas concurred on the grounds that the appeal was moot since the
ESA had expired by the time the Court considered the case. 298 Justice
Rehnquist's long dissent,299 which anticipated much of his majority opin-
ion in NLC, seemed both an outlier and, in retrospect, evidence of his
leadership on federalism issues.
Internal documents, however, tell a different story about the leading
voice on the Court and how difficult Fry was to decide. From the start
there was interest in reconsidering judicial limits to the commerce power
in Fry. Justices Rehnquist, Douglas, Stewart, and Powell provided the
four votes for certiorari . Rehnquist's dissent made his interest clear.3o'
Justices Douglas and Stewart likely voted for certiorari so they could
consider reversing Wirtz, in which they had both dissented seven years
earlier.302 Distinguishing Wirtz certainly seemed difficult to the writer of
the certiorari memo, who thought the government would win "hands
down" if Wirtz were not overruled.303 Justice Powell's notes indicate he
293. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 543-44 (1975).
294. Id. at 548.
295. Id. at 547.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 548.
298. Id. at 549 (Douglas, J., concurring).
299. Id at 557-58 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
300. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Fry Certiorari Vote Sheet, in Powell Papers, supra note 23.
301. Fry, 421 U.S. at 557-58 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
302. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 201 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) overruled by Nat'l
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
303. Pierce O'Donnell, Certiorari Memorandum (Dec. 31, 1974), in Powell Papers, supra note
23; Preliminary Memorandum for February 15, 1974 Certiorari Conference 5 (Jan. 29, 1974), in THE
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was ready to consider placing limits on Congress. "If [the] Commerce
Clause," he wrote, "allows [the] Fed[eral] [g]ov[ernment] to fix state
salaries, there's not much left to [fjederalism. Will state taxes & charges
for municipal services be next?" 3M The Fry case, he insisted, needed to
be discussed at conference. 3 05
That interest ebbed following oral argument. At the initial confer-
ence, no one voted to invalidate the ESA and the opinion was assigned to
Justice Marshall.306 But the breadth of Justice Marshall's first draft and
Justice Powell's interest in the opportunity to re-establish constitutional
federalism in NLC nearly cost Marshall his majority.
Marshall's first circulated draft was far more deferential to Con-
gress than his final opinion. The draft asserted that Wirtz had confirmed
United States v. California's holding that the sovereign governmental
functions of states were just as amenable to regulation under the Com-
merce Clause as their proprietary functions. 307 As a result, the ESA,
which everyone admitted was a regulation of interstate commerce, was
clearly constitutional as applied to the states.308 Justices White, Stewart,
and Blackmun quickly offered to join the opinion.30 9 Burger asked only
- 310for minor changes.
Powell, however, challenged Marshall's interpretation of Wirtz in
order to keep the Court's options open for NLC. In a memo circulated to
the Court, he asked Marshall to narrow his draft to focus on the tempo-
rary, emergency nature of the ESA.311 More importantly, he asked him to
remove his discussion of the line between "proprietary" and "govern-
mental" state functions. 3 12 Wirtz's discussion of that issue, Powell ar-
gued, was merely dicta and removing it would "leave[] open the possibil-
ity of distinguishing Wirtz in National League of Cities," as had been
discussed at the last conference. 313 If Marshall was unwilling to change
PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN (on file with the Library of Congress) [hereinafter BLACKMUN
PAPERS].
304. Pierce O'Donnell, Preliminary Memorandum (Jan. 29, 1974), in Powell Papers, supra
note 23 (handwritten note of Justice Powell).
305. Id.
306. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Fry Certiorari Vote Sheet, in Powell Papers, supra note 23.
307. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Third Draft, Fry v. United States 2 (Mar. 25, 1975), in THE
PAPERS OF WILLIAM J. BRENNAN (on file with the Library of Congress) [hereinafter BRENNAN
PAPERS).
308. Id. at 8.
309. See Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Jan. 9, 1975),
in Powell Papers, supra note 23; Letter from Justice Byron White to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Jan.
6, 1975), in Powell Papers, supra note 23; Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Justice Thurgood
Marshall (Jan. 6, 1975), in THE PAPERS OF THURGOOD MARSHALL (on file with the Library of
Congress) [hereinafter MARSHALL PAPERS].
310. Letter from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Jan. 8, 1975),
in MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 309.
311. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice Thurgood Marshall 2 (Jan. 14, 1975), in
MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 309.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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the opinion, Powell concluded, he would have to write a separate concur-
rence.314
Powell's note nearly cost Marshall his majority. Justices Rehnquist
and Blackmun quickly offered their support for the changes. 3 15 Rehnquist
even wrote that he might have to dissent, something that he seems to
have considered only after reading Powell's note.316 Marshall believed
Powell had coordinated the challenge to his opinion with Justice
Blackmun, and was furious. 3 17 His curt reply to Powell, which Blackmun
believed offensive, did not help.18 Fry, Marshall's memo insisted, had
been "cut to the bone" and was "as narrow a holding as I can imag-
ine." 1 It was not the breadth of his Fry draft that suggested NLC was
being prejudged, Marshall continued, it was Powell's suggestion that the
draft be changed.320
Things only got worse for Marshall after his note. The next day,
Rehnquist committed to dissent. 321 In February, Douglas circulated his
brief concurrence urging dismissal.3 22 In March, Powell circulated a brief
concurrence that made clear his belief that state sovereignty set some
323limits on Congress's commerce power. When Blackmun saw Powell's
concurrence, he formally withdrew his joinder to Marshall's opinion and
joined Powell. 324 Burger soon offered to join Powell as well. 325 Given
Stewart's decision to join Douglas in dissent in Wirtz, Marshall had eve-
ry reason to worry about losing him to Powell as well.
As his 9-0 majority opinion careened towards becoming a concur-
rence for just three Justices, Marshall agreed to Powell's changes. He
removed the discussion of the proprietary-governmental distinction and
integrated much of Powell's circulated concurrence.326 Though he was
314. Id
315. Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Jan. 15, 1975), in
MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 309; Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Thurgood
Marshall (Jan. 14, 1975) in MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 309.
316. Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Jan. 14, 1975), in
MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 309.
317. Note for File from Justice Harry A. Blackmun (April 8, 1975), in BLACKMUN PAPERS,
supra note 303.
318. Id.
319. Letter from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Justice Lewis F. Powell (Jan. 16, 1975), in
BLACKMUN PAPERS, supra note 303.
320. Id.
321. Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Jan. 17, 1975),
in BLACKMUN PAPERS, supra note 303.
322. Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Feb. 11, 1975), in
BLACKMUN PAPERS, supra note 303.
323. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Second Draft, Concurring Opinion, Fry v. United States (Mar.
20, 1975), in BLACKMUN PAPERS, supra note 303 (withdrawn on April 8, 1975).
324. Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Mar. 20, 1975), in
BLACKMUN PAPERS, supra note 303.
325. Letter from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice Lewis F. Powell (Mar. 27, 1975), in
BLACKMUN PAPERS, supra note 303.
326. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 548 (1975).
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prepared to publish his original opinion if he picked up no new votes, it
was unnecessary. 327 His changes were sufficient to bring everyone but
Rehnquist back on board.328 With the briefing in NLC already underway,
however, it was clear Fry was only the beginning. There seemed a clear
possibility that Powell could find as many as six votes to re-establish
constitutional federalism under the right circumstances. 329
B. Localism, Judicial Review, and Lewis Powell
Powell's interest in federalism questions is easy to understand. His
biographer John Jefferies describes his long-standing belief in the im-
portance of local government, local community, and especially neigh-
borhood schools.3 30 "He venerated the traditional connectedness of home,
church, and school[, and] . . . feared the rootlessness, the anonymity, the
impersonality of life in modern cities."33' In his opinions, these concerns
revealed themselves most clearly in his evaluation of court-ordered bus-
ing as a tool to achieve racial integration.3 3 2 For Powell, Jefferies wrote,
"the neighborhood school[s] epitomized the values of community, of
belonging, of cooperation [and] . . . common endeavor for the.public
good." 3 33 And he generally opposed busing because it undermined those
values. 3 4 He supported deference to state and local control in other cir-
cumstances, too. His majority opinion in San Antonio v. Rodriguez335 -a
class action suit by poor schoolchildren challenging a property-tax-based
school financing system on equal protection grounds-protected the flex-
ibility of the local school boards Powell had once been a member of.336
"The ultimate wisdom," he wrote,
327. Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Justices William 0. Brennan, Potter
Stewart, and Byron White (Mar. 25, 1975), in MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 309; Letter from
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Apr. 8, 1975), in MARSHALL PAPERS,
supra note 309.
328. Note for File from Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Apr. 8, 1975), in BLACKMUN PAPERS,
supra note 303 ("Now [Justice Marshall] has come around and, hopefully, should have a 7 to 2 vote
with [Justice Rehnquist] dissenting and [Justice Douglas] preferring to dismiss.").
329. Powell led the charge to limit Fry; Burger and Blackmun supported him; Rehnquist dis-
sented in Fry; and Stewart and Douglas dissented in Wirtz.
330. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 285 (1994).
331. Id. at 296-97. In a speech to the American Bar Association, Powell lamented the increas-
ing disconnection between citizens and the "[t]eachers, parents, neighbor[hood]s, ministers, employ-
ers," who were the "personal authorities [that] once gave direction to our lives." Id. at 297 (alteration
in original) (quoting Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Prayer Breakfast Speech to the American Bar
Association (Aug. 13, 1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Those relationships, Powell said,
"were something larger than ourselves, but never so large as to be remote, impersonal, or indifferent.
We gain[] from them an inner strength, a sense of belonging, as well as of responsibility to others."
Id. (quoting Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Prayer Breakfast Speech to the American Bar Association
(Aug. 13, 1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
332. Id. at 296-97.
333. Id. at 297.
334. Id at 285; see, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 246 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
335. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973).
336. Id. at 58-59.
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[of] these and related problems of education is not likely to be di-
vined for all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate
the[se] issues. In such circumstances, the judiciary is well advised to
refrain from interposing on the States inflexible constitutional re-
straints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued research
and experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions .... 337
"We are unwilling," Powell continued, "to assume for ourselves a level
of wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars, and educational au-
thorities in 50 [s]tates."
There was a crucial difference between a case like San Antonio and
NLC, however. Both certainly activated Powell's concern for local gov-
ernment and local community. But in cases like San Antonio, Powell's
concern with local community was reinforced by his concern with judi-
cial deference to the political branches. Protecting local autonomy in
NLC would require him to invalidate a law passed by Congress. It would
require, in other words, the very kind of judicial activism that was also a
central concern of Justice Powell.339 That concern would have been acute
in NLC because invalidating the law would require overturning a forty-
year-old precedent affirmed only eight years earlier.
C. The Political Safeguards Thesis in National League of Cities
Despite those concerns, Powell believed NLC required the return of
constitutional federalism. "This is the one we've been waiting for," wrote
Penny Clark, Powell's clerk for the arguments in Fry and the briefing in
NLC. 340 And memoranda from inside the Court indicate that he believed
it was the one he had been waiting for because it embodied his doubts
about the political safeguards thesis.341
Certainly the changes that influenced the growing skepticism of ob-
servers of the federal system outside the Court were also apparent to
Powell and his colleagues. Improvements in state government, the rising
power of interest groups, and growing federal administrative dysfunction
had been issues of public comment since the 1960s. Those issues were
raised by academic and public discussions of LBJ's "Creative Federal-
ism" agenda, 342 the Intergovernmental Relations Committee chaired by
337. Id at 43.
338. Id at 55. Powell's majority opinion in Warth v. Seldin adopted a similar approach in
denying standing to a challenge by citizens to the zoning decisions of the town of Penfield, which
they claimed excluded low-income people in violation of federal constitutional and statutory rights.
422 U.S. 490, 493 (1975). Ruling otherwise, Powell wrote, would call upon courts to decide ques-
tions "other governmental institutions may be more competent to address." Id at 500.
339. JEFFRIES, supra note 330, at 273.
340. Letter from Penny Clark to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Jan. 24, 1975), in Powell Papers,
supra note 23.
341. Memorandum for Conference from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Apr. 17, 1975), in Powell
Papers, supra note 23.
342. See generally CREATIVE FEDERALISM (Donald E. Nicoll ed., 1967).
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Senator Edmund Muskie,3 43 the Advisory Committee on Intergovern-
mental Relations,344 and Richard Nixon's New Federalism agenda.34 5 To
give just a few examples: in 1967 the New York Times covered former
North Carolina Governor Terry Sanford's critique of the federal system,
Storm over the States;346 in 1970, the Washington Post discussed James
Sundquist's Making Federalism Work, a clear example of changing
views on American federalism discussed in Section III; 34 7 and in 1972,
Washington Post editorialist David Broder discussed the Advisory
Committee on Intergovernmental Relations and its recognition of the
sharp increase in "political, popular and academic discussion[s] of Amer-
ican federalism."348
The success of Southern state governments in prosecuting the vio-
lence of white supremacists would have been even clearer, and perhaps
even more important to Powell who had served on the Richmond School
Board following Brown and was, wrote his biographer, "genuinely and
passionately opposed to massive resistance" 349 and "plainly appalled by
the threat to the rule of law" it created.350 Those changes, in other words,
would have made Powell and his colleagues doubt that the political safe-
guards thesis accurately described the system of American federalism,
just as they had for many observers outside the Court.
The doubts Justice Powell and his colleagues had about the political
safeguards thesis would have been strengthened by the briefs in NLC.
The National League of Cities and supporting amici made careful doctri-
nal arguments, but they also fanned doubts about the political safeguards
thesis with empirical assertions that would have been unconvincing two
decades earlier. Federal regulations were inflexible, undemocratic, and
ineffective in contrast to flexible, democratic, and effective state govern-
343. Creative Federalism Part I: The Federal Level: Hearing on S. 3509 and S.J. Res. 187
Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Comm. on Gov't Operations, 89th
Cong. (1966); Creative Federalism Part 2-A: The State-Local-Regional Level: Hearing on S. 671
and S. 698 Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Comm. on Govt Operations,
90th Cong. (1967); Creative Federalism Part 2-B: The State-Local-Regional Level: Hearing on S.
671 and S. 698 Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Comm. on Gov't Opera-
tions, 90th Cong. (1967).
344. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 195.
345. President Richard Nixon, Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs (Aug. 8, 1969)
(transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2191).
346. Peter Kihss, Report Demands Big Effort to Revitalize States, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1967, at
22.
347. Henry Owen, Federal Structure in Need ofReform, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1970, at A 18.
348. David S. Broder, The Crisis Continues, WASH. PosT, Mar. 14, 1972, at Al9 (quoting the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations' thirteenth annual report) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see, e.g., Ernest Holsendolph, Congress Urged to Renew Revenue-Sharing Pro-
gram, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1974, at 1.
349. JEFFRIES, supra note 330, at 179.
350. Id. at 149.
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ance. The 1974 FLSA Amendments, they implied, were passed only be-
cause of the power of national interest groups.351
Criticism of the FLSA amendments as inflexible and ineffective
was woven throughout the briefs. The law created "rigid nation-wide
uniform rules" and "centralize[d] power in [the Secretary of Labor] to
impose high cost, rigid, nation-wide uniformity, wiping out small cost
arrangements developed by experience to meet unique State and local
needs." 352 They caused "chaos," "conflict," "confusion,",353 "duplication,
uncertainty, litigation, and damage to fiscal integrity" of the states.354 To
understand the law, states, counties, and cities had to wade through "691
pages of a volume of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations," 85%
of which did not apply to them at all because they were written to regu-
late private industry. 355 The federal government, the briefs complained,
"does not possess all the knowledge, wisdom, fairness and reasonable-
ness" about the best terms of employment for state employees. 3 6 In fact,
the evidence was to the contrary. The Department of Labor's Wages and
Hours Division, which was slated to oversee wage rules for the states,
had already been criticized for "acting to retard progress and diversity in
flexible scheduling of both Federal and State and local employees." 357
Even worse, the rules were unnecessary. "[T]his centralization," ar-
gued the briefs, "is not mandated to wipe out substandard labor condi-
tions as such conditions do not exist among State[] and local Govern-
ments. They pay fair and reasonable salaries, fix reasonable hours and
have civil service, public sector collective bargaining and other laws
insuring that their employees [receive] . . . fair treatment." 358 And Con-
gress knew it. It had "ample and competent evidence that extension of
the Act to State and local Government employees was . . . unneces-
sary." 359 The act was so irrational that even the lawyers for the govern-
ment could cite "no evil of substance that the Act will cure . . . [or] any
wrong of substance that the Act will right."360
Perhaps worst of all, the law was undemocratic. Under the FLSA,
wage decisions would be "a policy decision of the Labor Department
mandated without the consideration of one elected official and without
351. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 31, at *18-24.
352. Id. at *32, *42, *44.
353. Id. at *32.
354. Reply Brief at *4, Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (No. 74-878), 1975 WL 173803, at
*4.
355. Brief for Appellants, supra note 31, at *49.
356. Id. at *56-57.
357. Id at *88.
358. Id. at *44.
359. Id. at *83.
360. Reply Brief, supra note 354, at *3.
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the approval of one constituent. "36 ' State and local control, in contrast,
provided "'ballot box control' [of] . . . the extent and nature of State and
,,362
City Government services. In sum, the law was a "nullification of the
People's power."363 It shifted power from the "People in each State" who
had exercised "ballot box control upon the services they need" to federal
bureaucrats and courts. 3  Henceforth, wages would be set by "Congress,
the Secretary of Labor, or the Federal Courts free from ballot box control
by the People in the States and Cities."365
Why was such an unproductive act passed when "[t]he history of
State and local Government in this Nation has been one of flexibility,
adaptation to change, and experimentation"? 36 The briefs offered a sim-
ple answer: the political power of labor unions. The only supporters of
the act mentioned by the brief were five major unions-the AFL-CIO,
SEIU, AFSCME, International Association of Fire Fighters, and Interna-
tional Conference of Police Associations-while it was opposed by
"[g]overnments at all levels," including the National League of Cities,
the U.S. Conference of Mayors, twenty-nine individual cities, both of
President Nixon's Secretaries of Labor, and even the President himself,
all of whom had argued that the extension of the Act was unnecessary.367
These arguments convinced Powell that NLC embodied his doubts
about the political safeguards. A memorandum he prepared before the
final discussions and vote in the case discussed the doctrinal complexi-
ties raised by the case, but more importantly it made clear why he be-
lieved an appropriate doctrine would limit Congress's commerce power:
his rejection of the political safeguards thesis. The facts of the case be-
fore him, he believed, demonstrated the theory's weakness. "One can
argue," he wrote, "that the states can 'trust' Congress not to go so far" as
to eliminate the right of the States to make their own personnel deci-
sions.368 "But," he continued,
the duty of this Court is to apply constitutional principle rather than
trust to legislative forbearance. The extension of FLSA to the states
in 1974 is an example. Judging by the briefs in this case, virtually
every state and city in the nation opposes this legislation. The Na-
tional Governors Conference and the National League of Cities are
parties. Two members of the Cabinet testified against the 1974
361. Supplemental Brief for Appellants on Reargument at *50, Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(No. 74-878), 1976 WL 181531, at *50.
362. Brief for Appellants, supra note 31, at * 113.
363. Reply Brief, supra note 354, at *26.
364. Id. at *25.
365. Id
366. Brief for Appellants, supra note 31, at *82.
367. Id at*18-21.
368. Notes for Use at Conference by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Mar. 4, 1976), in Powell
Papers, supra note 23.
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Amendment and the President vetoed it. Yet, the political muscle of
organized labor outweighed what appeared to be overwhelming local
political views to the contrary.369
Powell, in short, believed NLC embodied the argument against the politi-
cal safeguards thesis: the power of national interest groups overcame
expert opinion and the overwhelming views of state and local govern-
ments to muscle a dysfunctional law through Congress. And that conclu-
sion helped him convince his colleagues to invalidate an exercise of
Congress's commerce power on federalism grounds for the first time in
four decades.
D. National League of Cities Decided
Powell's plans for NLC, however, were scrambled and nearly de-
railed when William Douglas's stroke led to the appointment of John
Paul Stevens. Douglas suffered his stroke on January 1, 1975, after the
initial briefing but before oral arguments in NLC. 370 In recognition of his
absence and diminished capacity, his colleagues postponed decision in
any case that might turn on Douglas's vote. 371 The result was two oral
arguments and two votes in NLC: the first with Justice Douglas formally
on the Court, the second after Republican Gerald Ford had appointed
Stevens to Douglas's seat. These votes indicate that replacing a Demo-
cratic with a Republican appointee almost ended the return of constitu-
tional federalism before it began.372
Douglas's stroke kept him from the first conference, but the vote
was four to three with one abstention. Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, and
Blackmun voted to reverse on the grounds that Wirtz could be distin-
guished.373 Brennan, White, and Marshall voted to affirm on the grounds
that it could not.374 Justice Stewart was undecided. Wirtz, he believed,
could not be distinguished, and though he had earlier dissented in Wirtz,
he was unwilling to provide the fifth vote to overrule it. 375 As a result of
the agreement to postpone any decision in which Douglas's vote would
be determinative, Stewart's position-perhaps intentionally-required
reargument.
369. Notes for Use at Conference by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Mar. 4, 1976), in Powell
Papers, supra note 23.
370. HOYT,supra note 132, at 159.
371. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT 358 (1979).
372. See Conference Voting Sheet from the Supreme Court Conference on National League of
Cities v. Dunlop (Apr. 18, 1975), in Powell Papers, supra note 23; Letter from the Supreme Court
Conference on National League of Cities v. Dunlop (Mar. 5, 1976), in Powell Papers, supra note 23.
373. See Conference Voting Sheet from the Supreme Court Conference on National League of
Cities v. Dunlop (Apr. 18, 1975), in Powell Papers, supra note 23.
374. See Conference Voting Sheet from the Supreme Court Conference on National League of
Cities v. Dunlop (Apr. 18, 1975), in Powell Papers, supra note 23.
375. Id.
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We, of course, cannot be sure, but Douglas's dissent in Wirtz and
his decision to concur in Fry strongly suggests he would have voted to
invalidate the 1974 amendments in NLC. If he did stand by his Wirtz
dissent, Stewart would have joined him as he did in Wirtz and constitu-
tional federalism would have returned to the Supreme Court in a 6-3
decision joined-or perhaps written-by a Roosevelt appointee and
leader of the Warren Court.
But Douglas never had the chance to vote, and at the second confer-
ence his Republican replacement Stevens voted to uphold the law. 376 Had
Justice Stewart kept his earlier pledge not to be the fifth vote to overturn
Wirtz, the final vote in NLC would have been a 5-4 to uphold the law.
Replacing a Democratic with a Republican appointee thus nearly stopped
the return of constitutional federalism in its tracks. Stewart, however, for
unclear reasons, changed his plans, voted with Powell, and for the first
time since the New Deal the Court struck down an exercise of Con-
gress's commerce power on federalism grounds, 5-4.
V. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, THE RETURN OF CONSTITUTIONAL
FEDERALISM, AND THE CAUSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
This Article has used an historical examination of NLC to challenge
existing explanations for the return of constitutional federalism and offer
an alternative. That alternative seeks to reveal the interaction between
jurisprudential norms and political change rather than reduce legal argu-
ment to political preference or vice versa. I also hope it can provide a
case study in the processes of constitutional development and cast new
light on contemporary debates over constitutional federalism. But before
turning to those implications, it may be useful to clarify my causal claim
and differentiate it from competing explanations.
I have argued that the best way to explain the return of constitution-
al federalism begins by recognizing that the structural changes to Ameri-
can government and durable changes in political debate that occurred in
the late 1960s and early 1970s undermined broadly shared faith in politi-
cal safeguards thesis. Those structural changes in government made state
governments look more competent and the federal government look less
competent. They also emphasized the growing power of national interest
groups in contrast to the declining influence of states and localities. The
durable changes in American politics included, most importantly, the end
of the Southern states' acceptance, and even support, of the lawless vio-
lence of white supremacists. When combined with the belief that there
was an accelerating shift of real governing authority from the states to
the federal government, these changes created widespread doubt that the
political safeguards thesis was an accurate description of the American
federal system. Because the political safeguards thesis was the principle
376. Id.
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justification for judicial deference on federalism questions, doubts about
its accuracy led some to conclude that the judiciary should protect the
autonomy of state governments.
Most important among those who came to doubt the accuracy of the
political safeguards thesis was Justice Lewis Powell, who saw his doubts
about the political safeguards thesis embodied in the passage of the stat-
ute challenged in NLC. He thus concluded that the existing tension be-
tween the Court's commerce and tax power doctrines was a sufficient
justification for invalidating an exercise of Congress's commerce power
on federalism grounds for the first time in four decades. Four of his col-
leagues agreed, joined an opinion that rejected Justice Brennan's paean
to the political safeguards thesis, and inaugurated the return of constitu-
tional federalism.
This explanation does not deny that developments beyond the judi-
cial process caused the return of constitutional federalism. In fact, I have
argued that such changes were the proximate cause of the decision in
NLC and the return of federalism to a central place in debates in the
courts and the law reviews. Mine is not a formalist or strictly "internal-
ists" explanation.377 But I also believe this examination indicates that the
return of constitutional federalism cannot be explained without consider-
ing the specialized language of doctrinal analysis and conceptual struc-
tures of constitutional theory that Justices use to justify their decisions.
Most importantly, such approaches cannot explain why the return of con-
stitutional federalism originated with Justices Black and Douglas, or why
the replacement of a Democratic appointee with a Republican appointee
almost prevented the return of constitutional federalism. This is not a
fully "externalist" explanation, either.378
It is instead an attempt to answer calls for an approach to legal
change that integrates internal aspects of the judicial process with exter-
nal influences. 379 It argues that the decision in NLC-and the return of
constitutional federalism more broadly-are best explained by consider-
ing how developments outside the Court were filtered through the con-
ceptual structures of legal analysis. Justice Powell and the other members
of the Court, in other words, did respond to political change. But they did
not respond the same way non-judicial political actors would have. They
did not evaluate the social and political implications of the case before
them, then measure those implications against their political preferences.
And they were more than pawns controlled by larger political move-
377. G. Edward White, Constitutional Change and the New Deal: The Internalist/Externalist
Debate, 110 AM. HIST. REv. 1094, 1095 (2005) (defining "internalists"' and "externalists' under-
standings of legal change).
378. See id.
379. See, e.g., id. at 1115; Paul Frymer, Law and American Political Development, 33 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 779, 793 (2008); Keith E. Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: PostBehavior-
alist Approaches to Judicial Politics, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 601, 607 (2000).
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ments like the New Right. Rather, they responded to the changed politi-
cal environment as judges-as individuals operating in an institutional
context and with a personal identity that made the language of doctrinal
analysis and constitutional theory important determinants of their deci-
sions. They abandoned a posture of near-complete deference to Congress
on federalism issues because they concluded that the established legal
justification for that deference was unconvincing in light of the circum-
stances they saw around them.
This explanation for the return of constitutional federalism has most
in common with those offered by Keith Whittington and Edward Purcell,
but important differences remain, especially regarding the role of the
political safeguards thesis. Purcell has explored the causes of the return
of constitutional federalism in broad examinations that span nearly all of
the twentieth century.38 o That work recognizes that structural changes in
American government played a role in the return of constitutional feder-
alism38 ' and identified associations between it and jurisprudential devel-
opments, including originalism and economic approaches to legal analy-
sis.38 He has also explicitly recognized that jurisprudential ideas or doc-
trinal structures could shape debates over constitutional federalism in
383
some circumstances. His analysis is thus more textured than a simple
political explanation. But a central thrust of Purcell's work on the return
of constitutional federalism has been to emphasize the challenges of ex-
plaining those developments in purely legal terms and the central im-
portance of judges' personal values.3 84 That focus, together with the
broad scope of his work, have produced explanations for both NLC itself
and the return of constitutional federalism generally that strongly empha-
size the role of political preferences.385 Debates over the political safe-
guards thesis are largely a sideshow.386 Thus, despite the caveats he pro-
vided, I think it fair to characterize his approach as inconsistent with the
explanation I offer.
My primary difference with Whittington lies in our methods, which,
though they are in many ways complementary, nevertheless produce an
important disagreement over the role of the political safeguards thesis.
Whittington's goal, like mine, is to bridge the gap between internalist
380. See PURCELL, supra note 14; Purcell, supra note 14.
381. See PURCELL, supra note 14, at 178-79, 179 n.95 (citing Whittington, supra note 104).
382. See id at 179-81, 183-84; Purcell, supra note 14, at 161.
383. See PURCELL, supra note 14, at 190.
384. Id. at 8-9.
385. See Purcell, supra note 14, at 161-63. He characterized National League of Cities in
largely political terms: as an attempt by the Burger Court "to strike directly at the New Deal legacy
by reviving the Tenth Amendment." Id. at 163. "Although it employed the rhetoric of federalism,"
he continued, "the Burger Court seemed increasingly committed to a substantively conservative
political agenda, especially after the appointment of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in 1981." Id. at
162.
386. See PURCELL, supra note 14, at 158-59.
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and externalist perspectives. 3 87 We also see similar causes driving the
return of constitutional federalism. We both emphasize the importance of
durable changes in American politics, society, and jurisprudence,388 and
we identify many of the same changes: declining faith in federal exper-
tise,3 rising faith in state governments, 39 and changes in racial poli-
tics. 3 9 1 But the broad scope of Whittington's analysis, which covers dec-
ades of changes in multiple doctrinal areas, limits his ability to show how
those external changes interacted with the internalist norms of the legal
process. Ultimately, his primary evidence that the political, social, and
intellectual changes he identified actually caused the return of constitu-
tional federalism is the reasonable "common sense" relationship between
them. But without more direct evidence of the very interactions between
internal and external whose importance he is trying to show, his work
can be interpreted to indicate, as he recognizes, that the developments he
identified were important because they changed the political preferences
of judges who then simply instituted those preferences. 392 His investiga-
tion of the interaction between external and internal factors in federalism
doctrine is thus more suggestive than conclusive.
My focus on a single case, on the other hand, has allowed me to try
to trace the linkages between external changes and internalist structures.
Through a close examination of debates inside and outside of the Court, I
have tried to accomplish two things: (1) show that a specific set of
changes to American government and politics caused the return of con-
stitutional federalism, and (2) explain why those changes in particular-
rather than many other changes in American politics and society that
occurred during the same time-were important. My conclusion is that
those changes mattered because they undermined the widely shared faith
in the political safeguards thesis, which had been the nearly universally
accepted justification for judicial deference on federalism issues. The
result, I argued, was the return of constitutional federalism. One thus
cannot explain the return of constitutional federalism without under-
standing the role played by the political safeguard thesis. In many ways,
that makes my approach and Whittington's complementary. While his
work indicates that many of the factors I identify had salience in the
1990s and beyond, my analysis indicates that some of the associations
Whittington identified were important causes of the return of constitu-
tional federalism.
387. See Whittington, supra note 25, at 484.
388. Id. at 485; see Whittington, supra note 104, at 483-84.
389. See Whittington, supra note 25, at 498; Whittington, supra note 104, at 515-16.
390. Whittington, supra note 25, at 499, 502; Whittington, supra note 104, at 520-22.
391. See Whittington, supra note 25, at 494.
392. "It is possible that the Justices have considered such features of modem American life and
have developed a policy preference for devolution. They may act directly on that policy preference."
Whittington, supra note 25, at 500.
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But I do differ from Whittington-and others-in identifying the
political safeguards thesis as the jurisprudential structure most important
to the return of constitutional federalism. The concern of Whittington, as
well as Purcell and others, with current federalism doctrines, rather than
the return of the debate over constitutional federalism more broadly, led
them to see originalism and law and economics as the intellectual devel-
opments most important to the return of constitutional federalism. I find,
however, little evidence they played an important role in NLC. That indi-
cates that while originalism and law and economics have shaped the con-
tours of contemporary federalism doctrines in important ways, they did
not play a primary role in bringing the debate over federalism back to the
courts and the law reviews. Distinguishing of the causes most important
to the return of constitutional federalism from the causes most important
to the shape of contemporary federalism doctrines is, as I briefly discuss
below, of significant importance to contemporary debates over federal-
ism. It suggests that a form of constitutional federalism quite different
from the one we have now-one neither based on law and economics
and originalism nor led by Justices associated with conservatism-could
have emerged, and still might.
CONCLUSION
This integrative approach I have described seems to me the best
way to explain the return of constitutional federalism in NLC, but I also
hope that this Article can help today's close observers of the federal sys-
tem understand-and even improve-the contemporary debate over the
value of constitutional federalism. There are several ways it might con-
tribute. Certainly, this explanation suggests that there is little reason to
expect the debate over constitutional federalism to end anytime soon.
Most of the factors that undermined faith in the political safeguards of
federalism in the 1960s and 1970s have only accelerated since then.393 As
a result, even a brief perusal of the legal literature confirms what Justice
Breyer himself suggested in the oral arguments over the Affordable Care
Act: there is widespread but not universal doubt that the political safe-
guards of federalism provide a sufficient mechanism to limit federal
power.394 This continued doubt may help explain the limits the Court
placed on the spending power in NFIB v. Sebelius,395 as well as the in-
393. See, e.g., Kaden, supra note 265, at 867; Kramer, supra note 12, at 223-27; Saikrishna B.
Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 1459, 1487 (2001).
394. Transcript of Oral Argument at 75, Dep't of Health and Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S.
Ct. 1618 (2012) (No. 11-398) ("And, of course, the greatest limiting principle of all, which not too
many accept, so I'm not going to emphasize that, is the limiting principle derived from the fact that
members of Congress are elected from States and that 95 percent of the law of the United States is
State law. That is a principle though enforced by the legislature."); see, e.g., Prakash & Yoo, supra
note 393, at 1461; Kramer, supra note 12, at 234; Lee, supra note 74, at 333-40.
395. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012); see Huberfeld, supra
note 9, at 46.
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creasing interest in the ways federalism can advance interests traditional-
ly associated with the political left.
I also hope this explanation for the return of constitutional federal-
ism can help produce a more robust normative debate over the value of
constitutional federalism by undermining the assumption that it will in-
evitably be a tool to advance conservative values. By arguing that the
return of constitutional federalism has been and remains a simple product
of conservative politics, the political explanations for the return of con-
stitutional federalism subtly but powerfully suggest that constitutional
federalism is inherently conservative. That assumption in turn threatens
to impoverish contemporary debates over the proper role of constitution-
al federalism by discouraging ongoing efforts to identify ways that feder-
alism could advance the interests typically associated with the political
396left by scholars like Heather Gerken, Robert Schapiro, and others. By
focusing on the importance of structural changes and developing juris-
prudential norms, I hope this Article can remove the weight of the past
from that debate and encourage discussions about constitutional federal-
ism that are further enriched by contributions from scholars concerned
with issues typically associated with the left.
Finally, I hope that this integrative approach to understanding doc-
trinal change provides a case study that can provide some guidance to
those seeking constitutional change of any kind. Taken to its extreme, the
internalist perspective suggests that constitutional change is generated by
improved legal arguments, while the externalist perspective suggests that
improved legal argument is irrelevant. Politics, not legal argument, this
perspective suggests, is the path to constitutional change. The perspec-
tive offered here indicates that both politics and legal argument play a
role in generating constitutional change. It thus supports the insights of
scholars who have argued that meaningful changes in today's political
system are not likely to come from electoral mobilization alone. Instead,
with policy increasingly made in institutions like courts and bureaucra-
cies that are governed by particular sets of professional norms and that
are relatively insulated from electoral politics, meaningful change in-
396. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 9 (2010); Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, 24 DEMOCRACY 37, 37
(2012); Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New Blue Federalism, 3 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REV. 33, 33 (2009); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91
IOWA L. REV. 243, 272 (2005); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits ofDynamic Federalism in
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 182 (2006). Lawrence Tribe and Frank Michelman began
exploring such possibilities in their critique and interpretation of National League of Cities itself.
Tribe, for example, argued that the decision could be read to support judicial protection of states in
order to ensure that those states provide constitutionally required minimum government services. See
Tribe, supra note 24, at 1075-76; Michelman, supra note 24, at 1173.
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creasingly requires electoral mobilization in conjunction with new ideas,
new arguments, and new perspectives.3 97
This Article examines the past, but I hope its most important effects
will be on the future. My primary goal is to provide a better explanation
for one of the most important developments in modem constitutional
law: the return of constitutional federalism. But I do so in hopes of free-
ing contemporary analysis from understandings of the past that are inac-
curate and unhelpful. The past provides few clear answers. But under-
standing the past more accurately can clear the road to a better future.
397. STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE
FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 3 (2008).
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